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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the results of the Mini-Brayton Heat Source Assembly design
study. The study has been performed for the NASA Lewis Research Center under contract
NAS-16810.
1.1 OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study was to develop conceptual design definitions of a Heat Source
Assembly (HSA) for use in nominal 500 watt electrical (W(e)) 1200 W(e) and 2000 W(e)
Mini-Brayton isotope power systems. The HSA is an independent package which maintains
thermal and nuclear control of an isotope fueled Heat Source (HS) and transfers the thermal
energy to a Brayton Rotating Unit (BRU) - Turbine-Alternator-Compressor power conversion
unit.
1.2 SCOPE
The program was divided into the following four major tasks.
I. Safety Study
II. Conceptual Designs
I. Design Definitions
IV. Minimum Weight Conceptual Design
Volume I of this final repoft contains the results of Tasks I, II and I. Volume II is de-
voted to the Minimum Weight Concept developed during Task IV.
The safety study focused on the general safety problems associated with an isotope fueled
Mini-Brayton system. The purpose was to develop safety design requirements and guide-
lines consistent with a space shuttle launch, which must be factored into the HSA designs.
The manned space shuttle was selected as the reference mission since it imposes the most
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stringent safety requirement and represents a likely launch vehicle for future missions.
Emphasis was placed on thermal control, radiation protection and blast and fragmentation
protection. Space shuttle integration considerations, hazards, and potential accidents
were identified. A preliminary functional flow analysis for the baseline shuttle mission
encompassing the time frame between fabrication and recovery of the Heat Source, was
generated to facilitate this. The output of this investigation was a set of safety design
requirements and guidelines to ensure personnel safety through all mission phases; to
minimize the potential for accidents; and to preclude release of nuclear fuel to the
biosphere in the event of catastrophic accidents or failures.
The purpose of the Conceptual Design Study, Task II, was to develop candidate HSA
design concepts for a Space Shuttle mission that satisfy both design and safety require-
ments.
Concepts for each of the HSA functional components (except for the Heat Source) were
studied and the most promising ones integrated into overall HSA concepts. The output
was a number of different HSA concepts with an evaluation of advantages and disadvantages
of each. The Design Definition, Task III, encompassed more detailed definition of the three
most attractive conceptual designs for the Space Shuttle mission. The task included selection
of candidate materials, fabrication and assembly studies, thermal and hydraulic per-
formance analysis and structural sizing, and design layouts. Also included in this effort
was the definition of Ground Handling and Orbit Handling tools to ensure HSA design com-
patibility with nuclear handling requirements. Task IV, Minimum Weight Conceptual
Design, represented a modification to the original contract and was directed toward a
nominal 500 W(e) system for a Titan III C launch to synchronous orbit. Some of the basic
ground rules and design requirements that apply to the Space Shuttle mission (Tasks I II
and III) are different and consequently have significant impact of the design. The results
of Task IV are contained in Volume II.
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1.3 MINI-BRAYTON SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The Mini-Brayton power system is a closed gas loop system consisting fundamentally of
five major subsystems: a heat exchanger which accepts the energy from the heat source
(this assembly is the HSA), a Brayton rotating unit (BRU) which converts this heat energy
into electrical power, a heat rejection system which dissipates the waste heat, a recuperator
which enhances system efficiency, and an electrical control system.
The Brayton power conversion system is depicted in Figure 1-1. Energy is added by the
Heat Source to the working fluid in the HSHX, shown as Points 1 to 2. The gas leaves
the HSHX and is expanded in the turbine, Points 2 to 3. At Point 4, the gas entering the
recuperator from the turbine, preheats the gas entering the HSHX and consequently, is
cooled before re-entering the radiator.
Heat is rejected from the system in a radiator, Points 5 to 6. After exiting from the
radiator the gas is compressed, points 7 to 8, and is returned to the recuperator at
Point 9.
Three nominal electrical output power levels--500 W(e), 1200 W(e) and 2000 W(e) are
being considered; the system configuration for each of the three power levels is depicted
in Figure 1-2. For output power levels greater than 500 W(e), two or three 2400 W (t)
HSA's are manifolded in parallel and interfaced with a single power conversion system
(defined on Figure 1-1).
The Brayton power cycle has several outstanding characteristics which makes it very at-
tractive for space applications. First, the use of an inert gaseous working fluid allows the
cycle to operate over a wide temperature range which provides high Carnot efficiencies;
by employing a recuperator, high system efficiencies can be realized. Secondly, the
system is adaptable for efficient operation over wide range of power levels which can be
controlled by changing the system operating pressure while the turbomachinery size re-
mains fixed. Thirdly, a gaseous working fluid allows the user of simple, self-acting gas
bearings, ensuring long component life.
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Figure 1-1. Typical Isotope Brayton System
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Figure 1-2. Mini-Brayton System Configurations for
Various Output Power Levels
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An artist conception of an integrated Mini-Brayton Power Module mounted on a typical
spacecraft is shown in Figure 1-3. The system is depicted in a normal operational mode,
an auxiliary cooling mode on the pad, and in an emergency cooling mode in orbit with the
two end doors open.
1.4 HSA DEFINITION AND COMPONENTS
The Heat Source Assembly generates the thermal energy required for operation of the
Mini-Brayton System and transfers this energy via a Heat Exchanger fluid loop to the
Power Conversion System. The subsystems and respective components which collectively
comprise the HSA are listed in Table 1-1.
The Heat Source is fueled with 2400 watts (thermally) of 238PuO2 ceramic fuel of 82 percent
theoretical density. The design provides positive safety margins for any re-entry up to
11, 000 m/sec (36, 000 ft/sec) and for all credible accident modes. Since the Heat Source
will be flight qualified for the LES 8/9 mission, no additional design or test effort will be
required for the Mini-Brayton program. The Heat Source is described in detail in
Section 4.
The Heat Source Heat Exchanger transfers heat from the Heat Source to the Power Conversion
System by means of a Heat Exchanger and associated heaters and manifolding.
The Auxiliary Cooling Subsystem provides required cooling of the Heat Source and refractory
HSA materials during non-operational periods on the launch pad. Coolant is provided at the
launch complex.
The Emergency Cooling Subsystem is a passive system that is automatically activated in
emergency situations that could result in an over temperature condition of the Heat Source.
Such emergencies can be precipitated by unplanned delays in orbit achievement prior to start-
ing up the power system, failure of the Power Conversion System (e. g., loss of radiator
integrity, BRU failure, leaks in the gas loop, etc. ), unplanned shuttle landing in remote areas
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Figure 1-3. Mini-Brayton Power Module (Artist Concept)
where auxiliary coolant is unavailable, etc. The ECS is capable of operating during all
mission phases including prelaunch. It is unlikely, however, that the ECS would ever
activate during the prelaunch phase since auxiliary cooling is provided and the Heat Source
is under positive control.
The Inert Gas System (IGS) is used, if required, during Mini-Brayton prelaunch operational
periods at power to protect HSA refractory materials in oxidizing environments. The
subsystem utilizes the manifolding and cooling channels of the Auxiliary Cooling System
for the concept developed for the Space Shuttle mission, and provides an inert cover gas
of the appropriate purity. In essence the IGS is identical to ACS if the same coolant is used
for the auxiliary cooling, except that flow rates may be lower ( controlled by appropriate
valving).
The Heat Source Insulation Subsystem consists of multifoil insulation blankets which surround
the HSA structure and minimizes the heat loss from the system. Penetrations through the
insulation are provided for the primary cooling system and Auxiliary Cooling Subsystem
manifolds. Selection of insulation materials was not within the scope of this contract.
1.5 GROUND RULES
The program guidelines and constraints used as ground rules for the Space Shuttle mission.
1. The Heat Source design developed for the Multi-Hundred Watt (MHW)
Radioisotope Generator Program (AEC Contract No. AT(29-2)-2831) shall be
utiliz ed.
2. The HSA design shall permit removal of the Heat Source in space for a Space
Shuttle mission. (There is no requirement for Heat Source removal in space
for the'Titari IIrC mission.)
3. A space shuttle launch shall be assumed for the baseline mission.
4. The HSA shall be designed for at least a five (5) year operational lifetime
in space.
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5. A standard HSA with thermal output of 2400 W(t) (less any heat loss) for
use singly in a nominal 500 W (e) Mini-Brayton system shall be designed,
for the Space Shuttle mission. Two or three of these HSA's are to be manifolded
in parallel for a 1200 W(e) or 2000 W(e) Mini-Brayton system respectively.
6. Capability for ground operation of the Mini-Brayton system shall be provided.
7. The Mini-Brayton system shall be shut down during the prelaunch countdown
and launch phases of the mission. Startup shall be in orbit.
8. . It is assumed that the Mini-Brayton system will not have a requirement for
multiple startups after launch. The design however, shall not preclude
multiple startup during ground testing.
9. The HSA shall present no radiological hazard for any credible accident mode.
10, The requirement for a two year ground test of a flight configured Mini-Brayton
system shall be a consideration in the design of the HSA.
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Table 1-1. Heat Source Assembly Subsystems and Components
Subsystem or
Component Symbol Function Major Components
Heat Source HS Source of Thermal Energy for Power * PuO2 Fuel
Conversion System (2400 W(t)) * Re-entry Protection Systems
e Emissivity Sleeve
Heat Source Heat HSHX Transfers heat from the HS to the * Heat Exchanger
Exchanger Power Conversion System during * Headers
Normal Operation * Manifolds
Auxiliary Cooling ACS Cools HS during Non-Operational * Manifolds
Subsystem Periods on Launch Pad * Coolant
Emergency Cooling ECS Cooling Doors and Associated Devices * Insulated Doors
Subsystem which Automatically Open the Doors in * Hinges and Latches
Emergency Situations (for Space Shuttle * Emergency Cooling Device (ECD)
mission); Melting insulation for * Melting Insulation
Titan IIIC mission
Inert Gas Subsystem IGS Provides Inert Gas Environment * Inert Gas
(Cover Gas) To Protect HSA * Valving
Internals in Oxidizing Environments
at Power
Heat Source Insulation --- Limits Heat Loss from HS during * Multifoil Insulation
Subsystem Operation
SECTION 2
SUMMARY
The major conclusions of the study directed toward a Space Shuttle Mission, pertaining to
safety requirements, HSA configuration and material selection are summarized in this
section.
2.1 SAFETY
2.1.1 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW
The underlying safety requirement for HSA design and operation, is that no radiological
hazard exist during any mission phase or during any credible accident mode. Under
steady state conditions, the maximum PICS* iridium/PuO2 fuel interface temperature
should not exceed 17730 K (2732 F). The corresponding Heat Source surface tempera-
ture is below 13250K (20120F). This PICS/fuel interface temperature limit assures
positive containment of the fuel and is based on the fact that, at the present time,
experimental data only verifies the long term compatibility of the iridium and PuO2
fuel up to the indicated temperature. Although sufficient margin should be available
for sustained operation at higher temperature, a fuels test program would be required
to substantiate this fact.
The principal safety requirements to which the HSA is designed are as follows:
1. Prelaunch
a. Provide thermal control to maintain all exposed surface areas of the
Heat Source Assembly (HSA) below 466. 50 K (380 0 F) to preclude in-
advertent ignition of shuttle propellants.
b. Provide thermal control to limit Heat Source temperatures to safe
levels (surface temperature < 13250K (20120 F)) while the power system
is non-operational.
*Post Impact Containment Shell (see Section 4. 1).
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c. A design goal shall be to assure containment of all radioactive
material should the Heat Source Assembly or Heat Source be
exposed to a fireball or solid propellant fire which may result
from a shuttle explosion.
2. Launch and Ascent
a. Provide thermal control to limit Heat Source temperatures to safe
levels, prior to startup while the power system is non-operational
(surface temperature < 1325 ° K (20120 F)).
b. Limit radiation dose levels to the shuttle crew to less than 6. 25 MRem/
hr. This requirement applies to all mission phases when the HSA is
within the shuttle payload bay.
3. Operational
a. Provide thermal control to limit Heat Source temperatures to safe
levels (surface temperature < 13250 K) in the event the helium xenon
fluid loop fails during normal operation.
b. The Heat Source shall survive an earth orbital reentry in the following
initial configuration:
(1) A free, unencumbered, Heat Source.
(2) A free, unencumbered Heat Source Assembly.
During reentry, the PICS iridium/carbon interface shall not exceed
23720 K (3810' F).
4. Return
a. Provide thermal control to limit Heat Source temperatures to safe
levels (surface temperature < 1325'K 20120 F)) during shuttle
return from orbit operations:
(1) While the BRU is non-operational, or
(2) After removal of the Heat Source from the HSA.
2.1.2 HSA SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES
The MHW isotope heat source used in the Mini-Brayton HSA is being designed to
withstand the Titan IIIC liquid and solid propellant fireball explosion over pressure
environments. The MHW Heat Source is also designed to survive re-entry at super-
orbital velocities with subsequent impact on granite at 89 m/sec (293 ft/sec). Re-entry
from a Mini-Brayton mission earth orbital decay will of course impose less severe
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conditions on the Heat Source. A preliminary analysis indicates that the Heat Source
will survive an earth orbital decay of the entire Heat Source Assembly configuration.
For shuttle applications, shielding from blast fragmentation will probably be required
within the shuttle payload bay. The requirements for a fragmentation shield are
discussed in paragraph 5. 4. 2. 3.
Radiation dose levels to the shuttle crew will be below maximum permissible levels
provided that the Heat Source Assembly (in its largest curie inventory for the 2000
Watt(e) Mini-Brayton configuration) is located at least five meters from the crew
compartment. Radiation shielding will not be required for a shuttle mission if this
requirement is met.
2.2 HSA CONCEPTS
Three candidate HSA concepts which differ only in Heat Source Heat Exchanger design
have been developed and are depicted in the sketches of Figure 2-1. One of these is
an HSHX consisting of an axial bank of thirty-five (35) 0. 95 cm (3/8") OD tubes. The
other two HSHX configurations are both plate fin heat exchangers. One incorporates
corrugated fins, running axially in the annulus formed by two concentric cylinders.
The other plate fin design is similar except that the fins are machined out of the
inner cylinder. All three HSA concepts provide for flow of an auxiliary cooling gas
directly over the Heat Source in the annulus formed by the outer surface of the Heat
Source and the Heat Source Heat Exchanger. Emergency cooling is effected by the
automatic activation by the ECD of two flat insulated doors on opposite ends of the
HSA. One of these doors also serves as the Heat Source loading door.
During or prior to pre-launch operations, the HSA(s) less the Heat Source(s) will be
assembled into the Mini-Brayton Power Conversion system. The Heat Source(s)
will be removed from its environmentally controlled shipping cask and loaded into
the HSA(s) as late in the countdown sequence as possible.
A detailed engineering drawing of the machined plate fin HSA design is given in
Figure 2-2. Both the Heat Source and the HSHX are supported off a cylindrical
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support container which is adjacent to, and inboard of the insulation blanket. HSA
support flanges are attached to the container to interface with shuttle support hardware.
The HSHX is supported off the container by frames at both ends. Four HSHX tubular
support struts provide torsional stiffness and take out longitudinal launch loads on the
HSHX. They also are designed to permit thermal expansion of the HSHX during heatup
without inducing adverse thermal stresses.
The Heat Source is supported off the support container by forward and aft Heat Source
Supports and End Enclosures. The Heat Source Support is similar in design to the
MHW support and provides the interface with the Heat Source and the End Enclosure.
The End Enclosures, which are very similar in design to the MHW End Enclosures,
consist of six spider like radial "I" beams with interconnecting webs. Three retaining
screws are provided as a redundant component to release the End Enclosure preload
in event of freeze up of the bushing when removing the Heat Source in orbit.
The size, weight and performance characteristics of the three HSA concepts are
summarized below. Envelope and weight are not optimized for the designs.
HSA Concept Machined Corrugated
Tubular Plate Fin Plate Fin
Characteristic HSHX HSHX HSHX
Envelope
Length, cm (in.) 66. 95 (26. 36) 66. 95 (26. 36) 66. 95 (26. 36)
Diameter, cm (in.) 35. 84 (14. 12) 35. 84 (14. 12) 35. 84 (14. 12)
Weight, kg (lb) 71.8 (158) 77.7 (171) 78.6 (173)
HSHX Design Pressure, 79 (115) 79 (115) 79 (115)
N/cm 2 (psi)
Max Allowable Total Pressure 0. 151 (0. 22) 0. 151 (0. 22) 0. 151 (0. 22)
Drop, * N/cm 2 (psi)
Max Heat Source Surface** 1319 (1915) 1269 (1825) 1230 (1755)
Temperature, K (' F)
* For a single HSA in 500 W(e) power system.
**For a HSHX emissivity of e = 0. 4.
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The tubular HSHX results in the highest Heat Source operational temperature and has
the largest number of joints. Both welding and brazing procedures are required in
its fabrication.
The corrugated plate fin HSHX results in the lowest Heat Source operational tempera-
ture, but provides the least well dimensionally controlled and stable flow channels.
Fabrication of the HSHX requires welding and brazing operations.
The machined plate fin HSHX results in a Heat Source operational temperature inter-
mediate between the tubular and corrugated plate designs, has well-defined flow
channels, and can be fabricated without brazing. It may be possible to reduce Heat
Source temperatures by increasing the number of machined fins. At this point in the
program, it is the preferred design.
2.3 MATERIAL SELECTION
Three classes of materials - super alloys, noble metal alloys and refractory alloys
were considered for the HSHX. Super alloys were eliminated because they exhibit
marginal strength at the HSA operational temperatures and exhibit excessive evapora-.
tion loss in vacuum over a 5-year lifetime. Noble metal alloys were eliminated
because they are excessively costly and are still in a development stage. The prin-
cipal candidate refractory alloys considered which satisfy strength and operation
environmental conditions were Cb-103, Cb-lZr, Cb-129Y, T-111 and Ta-10W. These
candidates were narrowed down to Cb-103 and Cb-1Zr primarily by considerations
of weight and fabricability. Additional long term creep strength data at HSA opera-
tional temperatures and further characterization of both materials are required to
make a final selection.
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SECTION 3
SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
3.1 SPACE SHUTTLE INTEGRATION AND INTERFACES (Reference 1)
The baseline mission for this study is a launch of the Mini-Brayton system and
recovery of the Heat Source in the Space Shuttle. Since the shuttle is not completely
designed yet, interface and integration definition must be considered preliminary.
3.1.1 GENERAL
The Mini-Brayton system is housed within the 15-foot diameter, 60-foot long shuttle
payload bay. Multiple standardized attachment points are located in the payload bay
to structurally support shuttle payloads.
The orbiter has the capability to expose the entire length and full width of the payload
bay, providing an unobstructed 180 degree lateral field of view. Nonstructural payload
service panels are placed at discrete locations in the payload bay wall for GSE service
access. Payload panels designed to service a particular payload can replace the
blank service panels. Payload checkout and caution and warning systems are provided
in the crew compartment.
A shuttle remote Manipulator System consisting of a pair of remote manipulator arms
is provided for deployment and retrieval of a payload such as the Mini-Brayton system.
Payload engagement is accomplished through terminal devices on the end of each arm.
Electrical power for shuttle payloads is available from the orbiter electrical power
system. An electrical energy allowance of 50 kilowatt-hours of nominal 30 Vdc
power is dedicated for payload support with energy in excess of this allocation being
mission dependent and capable of being supplemented by additional consumables to
the orbiter fuel cells and/or by independent payload systems.
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3.1.2 PAYLOAD BAY ENVIRONMENT
3. 1. 2. 1 Vibration and Acceleration
Vibration environment within the payload bay will not exceed current launch vehicle
payload environments.
The maximum steady state acceleration loads in any direction during boost, re-entry,
landing and taxiing is 3 g's.
3. 1. 2. 2 Thermal Environment
The shuttle payload bay internal wall temperature limits for preliminary interface
considerations are as follows:
Condition Minimum Temp Maximum Temp
Pre-launch 277. 60 K (400 F) 322 0 K (1200 F)
Launch 277. 60 K (400 F) 338. 70 K (1500 F)
On Orbit (Doors-closed) 2000K (-100° F) 338. 7 K (1500 F)
Entry and Post Landing 2000 K (-1000 F) 366. 5 K (2000 F)
During ascent the Heat Source will rise in temperature from a precooled initial state
of less than 6440 K (7000 F), at a rate of approximately 416 ° K/hr (750' F/hr). During
heatup to operational temperature levels a negligible heat load from the HSA will be
dumped to the payload bay walls. Once the HSA reaches the operational temperature
level the Mini-Brayton power system should be started up. Waste energy from the
Mini-Brayton radiator can be radiated to space by opening the payload doors at this
time.
If the payload bay cannot be passively controlled, provisions for limited active thermal
control of the payload is available from the shuttle orbiter. Active payload thermal
control is supplied by the exchanger in the orbiter to support the payload in the pay-
load bay. The heat transfer capacity for payloads equipment has a peak capacity of
1520 watts (5200 BTU/Hr) during peak orbiter operations.
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3. 1. 2. 3 Payload Bay Atmosphere
The orbiter payload bay can be atmospherically controlled while on the launch pad.
This provision allows the control of the temperature, humidity, atmospheric composi-
tion, and particle contamination of the payload bay by the use of launch site GSE. A
nitrogen purge capability is provided for inerting the payload bay prior to launch if
required.
The orbiter payload bay is vented during the launch and entry phases, and operates
unpressurized during the orbital phase of the mission.
3.1.3 MINI-BRAYTON/SHUTTLE INTEGRATION
1. Mechanical Integration - A transfer module, consisting of carriage type of
assembly can provide a safe and convenient method of handling the Mini-
Brayton payload and mounting it in the Space Shuttle payload bay. This con-
cept allows the payload to be placed in the transfer module prior to shuttle
integration. A key advantage is that ancillary equipment, if required, can
be incorporated into the transfer module rather than mounted to the shuttle;
for example, the capability to provide coolant gas during ascent or re-entry
could be readily accomplished by the transfer module. A disadvantage of
this approach is the weight and volume penalty associated with the additional.
hardware carried into orbit.
2. On-Pad Cooling - On-pad coolant for the HSA Auxiliary Cooling Subsystem
will be provided by launch facility ground cooling equipment and ducted by
appropriate umbilicals to the HSA in the payload bay. A payload bay service
panel will interface with this quick disconnect umbilical and with a short
cooling duct in the payload bay that is connected to the ACS inlet port. Upon
landing at the end of mission, ground cooling equipment can again provide
coolant, as required, during shuttle safing operations.
3. Heat Source Venting - Decay of the PuO2 fuel generates helium gas which is
ultimately vented from the Heat Source. The rate of helium generation at
beginning of life is approximately 1. 2 x 10- 4 scc/sec and is sufficiently
small so that the gas can be vented to the payload bay. If for any reason
this is undesirable, a vent tube can be provided to dump the helium directly
overboard through a payload service panel.
3.2 PRELIMINARY MISSION ANALYSIS
The mission analysis was primarily aimed at identifying the functional operations
which occur sequentially starting with fabrication and ending with recovery, including
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contingencies for aborts and operational options. The mission is depicted in the form
of functional flow block diagrams in Figures 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3.
The top level functions (Figure 3-1) corresponding to mission phases are:
8. 0 - Fabricate, Assemble, Test and Ship
7. O0 - Perform Ground Flow Operations at Launch Facility
6. 0 - Perform Prelaunch and Countdown Operations
5. O0 - Launch and Inject into Orbit
4.0 - Perform Orbital Payload Checkout
3. 0 - Transfer Payload in Orbit
2. O0 - Perform Payload Orbit Operations
1.0 - Recover Payload
The option of mission operation of the payload (Mini-Brayton Power Conversion System)
in orbit within the shuttle, or on a payload deployed from the shuttle, is shown.
Figure 3-2 shows the first level functional flow from fabrication through shipping to the
launch site. It is proposed that the initial Mini-Brayton system tests be performed by
the integration contractor with the Electrical Heat Source developed for the MHW-RTG
program. After the system is qualified, the Mini-Brayton is acceptance tested at an
AEC licensed facility in a system configuration with the isotope heat source. After
completion of the tests, the Heat Source is shipped to the launch site separately from
other Mini-Brayton hardware in an existing shipping cask designed for the MHW-RTG
program. The shipping cask provides cooling of the heat source and requisite radiation
shielding.
Figure 3-3 is an integrated functional flow block diagram that shows all the first level
functions from launch facility operations through recovery. Options are shown on the
functional flow block diagram to either install the Mini-Brayton System (payload) in
the Maintenance and Refurbishment Facility, in the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB)
either before or after mating of the Solid Rocket Motors (SRM's), or on the pad. Upon
landing there is an option of either removing the Heat Source after orbiter safing or
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leaving it in the shuttle orbiter and removing it at the Maintenance and Refurbishment
Facility. Lines that emanate from the bottom of the functional blocks with a symbol
"G" indicate "NO GO" situations or aborts. The reference mission shown by the dotted
lines, however, does not include any aborts.
Briefly this mission is as follows:
Mission Phase Comments
Ground Flow Operations The Heat Source is installed in the Shuttle Orbiter
payload bay on the pad. Installation and checkout
must be accomplished in not more than 10 hours
elapsed time prior to T-2 hours.
Prelaunch and Countdown This period lasts approximately 48 hours and is
devoted primarily to verifying the Launch Um-
bilical Tower/Launch Facility connections, per-
forming final integrated tests servicing the ve-
hicle, loading the crew and passengers and final
closeout. It is within this time frame that the
Heat Source is installed. Heat Source cooling
will be provided by GSE during this phase of the
mission. The Mini-Brayton Power Conversion
System is not operating during this mission phase.
Launch and Insert Into Orbit The Mini-Brayton Power Conversion System does
not operate during launch and orbit insertion.
Provisions are made for monitoring and display-
ing HSA parameters to the flight crew and mission
specialists during this phase and during all ensu-
ing phases when the power system is within the
shuttle orbiter payload bay.
Orbital Payload Checkout During this phase of the mission the Mini-Brayton
power conversion system is started up and check-
ed out in the Shuttle Orbiter Payload bay.
Transfer Payload from The Mini-Brayton system is deployed from the
Shuttle shuttle during this phase. It is assumed that the
system is attached to a spacecraft which is de-
ployed from the shuttle and is operating during
the deployment operation.
Perform Payload Orbit During this phase the Mini-Brayton System
Operations operates on board an earth orbiting spacecraft.
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Mission Phase Comments
Transfer Payload to Shuttle The Mini-Brayton System is retrieved and trans-
ferred back to the Shuttle Orbiter payload bay.
Two options are considered, viz: transferring
the spacecraft with the Mini-Brayton system
attached to it or transferring just the Heat Source
back to the Shuttle.
Recover Payload During this phase the Shuttle Orbiter performs a
re-entry and lands at its designated site. Follow-
ing the landing the orbiter is towed to a safing
area where the crew and passengers disembark.
It is assumed that GSE will be available to cool
the Heat Source at the safing area and during
transfer of the Shuttle Orbiter to the Maintenance
and Refurbishment Facility where the Heat Source
is removed, serviced or disposed of.
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SECTION 4
HEAT SOURCE
The Multi-Hundred Watt RTG Heat Source developed for the AEC under contract
AT(29-2)-2831 will be used "as is" for the Mini-Brayton design. The first application
of the Heat Source will be for the LES 8/9 mission to be launched in 1975. The physical
description and specifications are described in the following paragraphs:
4.1 PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Figure 4-1 shows a pictorial view of the Heat Source. The primary Heat Source
component is the Fuel Sphere Assembly (FSA) which is a self-contained modular fuel
element. The FSA's are arranged in six (6) planes of four (4) spheres each; adjacent
planes are rotated 45 degrees to achieve nesting and to minimize length. The FSA's
are held in place in groups of eight (8) by three (3) segmented graphite retaining rings
with conical seats. Woven graphite cloth compliance pads are positioned between each
FSA plane to achieve a tight fit without tight tolerance control and to provide vibration
damping. Each FSA consists of a sphere of plutonium dioxide 238, having a nominal
diameter of 3. 7 cm (1. 465 inches) contained in a 0. 051 cm (0. 02 inches) thick iridium
shell. The iridium shell, called the Post Impact Containment Shell (PICS), provides
the primary fuel containment and together with the fuel is defined as the Post Impact
Shell Assembly (PISA). The PISA is protected from impact by a 1. 17 cm (0. 460 inch)
spherical graphite shell, called the Impact Shell. The three basic components, fuel,
PICS and Impact Shell, together comprise the FSA.
The 24 FSA's in the retaining rings are surrounded by a 1. 02 cm (0. 4 inch) cylindrical
purified polycrystalline (POCO) graphite ablative heat shield aeroshell, which is de-
signed to provide re-entry protection. Laminated crush-up material is provided at
both ends of the cylinder for additional impact protection; threaded graphite and caps
complete this part of the assembly.
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Figure 4-1. MHW Heat Source
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The entire assembly is encased with a 0. 025 cm (0. 010 inch) iridium clad which serves
to protect the graphite aeroshell from oxidation during ground handling, to contain the
helium generated by isotope decay, and to provide additional re-entry protection for
those cases in which multiple skips could be encountered. The iridium clad has three
lifting lugs for handling. It is surrounded by a 0. 127 cmt (0. 05 inch) woven graphite
yarn emissivity sleeve (also called the "girdle") which slips over the iridium clad and
engages three bosses. The emissivity sleeve provides:
1. A high emissivity surface (e = 0. 85) to enhance radiation heat exchange,
2. Hoop strength, and
3. Additional re-entry margin.
The heat source has a vent tube protruding from one end of the assembly to vent inter-
nally generated helium. The overall maximum envelope of the heat source assembly
is:
Length - 42. 5 cm (16. 69 inches)
Diameter - 18. 7 cm (7. 347 inches).
The Heat Source weighs approximately 21. 6 kg (48 lbs).
4.2 SPECIFICATIONS
The MHW Heat Source is designed to the following specifications:
1. Thermal power - 2400 ± 30 watts.
2. Operating life - 6 years including one year of storage and test (5 years
orbital operation)
3. Maximum temperature of any iridium surface - 17730 K (27320 F).
4. Maximum long term steady state operating temperature of external surface -
1373- K (20120 F).
The heat source is designed to immobilize the fuel during potential prelaunch and
launch failures. Safety design features are discussed in Section 5.
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SECTION 5
SAFETY
The objective of the Safety Study was to specify a set of safety requirements and guide-
lines for development of a safe Heat Source Assembly design. In order to accomplish
this, all potential accident conditions which must be factored into the design to make
it safe for handling, storage, launch, operation and recovery have been identified for
the baseline mission. The capability of the MHW Heat Source to survive the accident
environments has been assessed.
5.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
The general requirements for design of nuclear systems are:
1. Radioactive materials shall be packaged and prepared for shipment in a
manner that provides assurance of protection to the public health and safety
during transportation of such materials. This will be accomplished by
using the approved MHW Heat Source shipping cask and shipping procedures.
2. Radiation protection shall be provided to assure that radiation exposures
to personnel and population groups are limited to the lowest possible levels.
This will be accomplished by launch operation constraints.
3. Preclude the release and dissemination of radioactive fuel, especially
significant respirable particles. This will be accomplished by utilizing
the MHW Heat Source which will survive all credible accidents.
4. Maximize long term immobilization of the nuclear heat source following
potential accidents. The MHW Heat Source is designed to meet this re-
quirement.
5.2 MHW HEAT SOURCE SAFETY DESIGN CAPABILITY
The MHW Heat Source under development by the AEC and GE has been designed to
survive the following environments (Reference 2). The on-pad explosions apply to a
Titan IIIC launch. In the absence of detailed definition of shuttle accident environ-
ments, the Titan IIIC environments have been used as a point of departure in Section
5. 4 for specifying preliminary Mini-Brayton requirements.
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5.2.1 EXPLOSION - LIQUID PROPELLANT FIRE
A fireball with temperatures decaying from approximately 29600 K to 19220 K (49000 F
to 30000 F) in about eight seconds followed by a residual fire at a temperature of
12970 K (1875 ° F) lasting for 1/2 hour will not cause release of fuel from a heat source.
In the unlikely case that a bare Fuel Sphere Assembly is exposed to the enveloping
environment, no fuel release should occur.
5.2.2 EXPLOSION - SOLID PROPELLANT FIRE
A mass of burning propellant with a surface temperature of 26200 K (42500 F) lasting
for ten minutes:
1. For the case in which a bare FSA is located on the top of a burning solid
fuel segment breach of the fuel containment will not occur. The probability
of this condition occurring is extremely remote.
2. For the case in which a Heat Source, an FSA or even a PISA rests between
burning propellant segments, no fuel release occurs.
5.2.3 EXPLOSION - BLAST WAVE OVERPRESSURE
Characterization of the blast wave environment on a particular body is dependent on
the overall configuration, type of burning propellant and properties of the shock
front. Generally a body exposed to direct impingement of a spherically expanding
shock wave will receive an instantaneous rise of a reflected shock wave pressure
as blast wave impulses on the assembly. The reflected overpressure decays rapidly
to the stagnation overpressure in the time it takes to clear the body of reflection
effects. The remaining dynamic portion of the blast wave dies out followed by a
decay in the static or side on overpressure until ambient levels are reached. The
environment experience by a particular body is also configuration dependent and
influenced by the degree of attenuation afforded by surrounding or intervening
structure. In the case of the MHW-RTG mounted atop the LES 8/9 spacecraft some
3. 7 m (12 ft) from a Titan IIIC transtage explosion, the spacecraft offers sufficient
attenuation blockage to prevent the reflected shock wave impingement effect. Figure
5-1 shows the predicted environment experienced by the MHW-RTG for a 5% explo-
sion yield.
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With a Mini-Brayton system arrangement such as that shown in Figure 1-3, structural
intervention and attenuation would similarily be afforded to the Heat Source by the
Power Conversion System Equipment and Spacecraft Structure. Therefore, the en-
vironment shown in Figure 5-1 is typical of what can be expected for a Mini-Brayton
System in a similar configuration. Practical considerations of weight does not permit
designing the structure for the blast environment; however, for safety reasons assur-
ance must be given that the Isotopic fuel is not released from its encapsulated fuel
container. Structural elements will normally breakup at 1% yields, releasing the Heat
Source; however the 2 to 4 millisecond typical delay in break up permits attenuation of
the primary shock front before arriving at the Heat Source (HS). Principle damage to
the HS from blast wave is expected from impacting of structural fragments and compo-
nents located in the near vicinity of the HS such as those housed within the Power Con-
version Systems (PCS). Analysis of the MHW shows the HS will survive a freefall drop
from a pad abort of 42. 5 m/sec (140 ft/sec) after being exposed to minor damage im-
pacts from equipment at velocities of 21. 3 to 48. 5 m/sec (70 to 160 ft/sec) with re-
spective masses of 17. 2 and 7. 7 kg (38 and 17 lb). The largest mass equipment items
in the PCS consists of the Rotating unit, -8. 2 kg (-18 lbs) and the Recuperator, -15. 8
kg (-35 lbs). As such, it is concluded that no damage of the Mini-Brayton HS, as a
result of an environment equivalent to a Titan IIIC 5% yield blast environment, will
occur which will cause release of the fuel from its Post Impact Containment Shell
(PICS) when configured in an arrangement similar to that shown in Figure 1-3.
5.2.4 RE-ENTRY
The Heat Source is designed to survive re-entry from orbital altitudes with initial
conditions of 121,920 km (400,000 feet) and velocities of up to 11,064 m/sec (36,300
ft/sec) and path angles of 0 to 90 degrees to the local horizontal. The spectrum of
reentry conditions includes the following:
1. Minimum reentry angle - the angle separating multiple skip and capture
reentries. This is the most severe thermal response situation and a
severe ablation case. Analysis indicates a 53% margin of ablative material.
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2. Multiple skip - this is the most severe ablation case. Analysis indicates a
27% margin of ablative material.
3. Steep angle - this is the most severe thermal stress condition. Analysis
indicates a design margin of 28% in the tensile stress at the inner aeroshell
layers at the stagnation point. Compressive stress cases have margins
greater than a factor of 3-1/2.
5.2.5 IMPACT
The MHW has successfully demonstrated the survival capability of the Heat Source
Fuel Sphere Assemblies (FSA's) at HS impact velocities up to 87 m/sec (286 ft/sec)
on a hard granite surface. Single sphere FSA tests have demonstrated 89 m/sec (295
ft/sec) and rocket sled impact tests of an assembled HS has demonstrated 286 ft/sec.
Expected terminal velocities for the normal reentry conditions defined above are 78
m/sec (256 ft/sec), thus giving approximately a 10% margin.
Figure 5-2 presents an analytical summary of the HS impact velocities required in
order to release fuel from the Post Impact Containment Shell (PICS) when the HS is
impacted on various earth media.
5.3 MINI-BRAYTON RADIATION SHIELDING REQUIREMENTS
5.3.1 PERMISSIBLE DOSE LEVELS
The allowable exposure limit currently in use by NASA (References 3 and 4) is a yearly
average of 200 mrem/day to bone marrow (5 cm depth) from all radiation sources.
Cosmic, galactic, and trapped radiation contribute approximately 50 mrem/day.
Therefore, the shuttle crew exposure should by limited to a maximum allowable dose
rate from the nuclear payload of 150 mrem/day, or 6. 25 mrem/hr. The 150 mrem/
day maximum allowable dose is based on yearly averages. Since most crew time
durations are short, higher dose rates may be permissible for shorter periods of
time.
5.3.2 HEAT SOURCE NUCLEAR RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
The total dose rates from one, two and three MHW Pu-238 Heat Sources as a function
of distance from the fuel is given in Figure 5-3. The doses are shown for neutron
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and gamma radiation. The neutron source strength was taken as 6 x 103 Neutrons/
sec - gm Pu (Reference 5). The total mass of PuO2 in a single 2400 watt heat source
is 6000 gms.
Figure 5-4 shows the number of hours per day which a shuttle crew member can spend
in the vicinity of the HSA's. It is evident that if the HSA's are located approximately
5. 0 meters from the crew, then the largest Mini-Brayton System (3 HSA's) need not
be shielded to protect the crew compartment. It is also evident that reasonable amounts
of time may be spent by a crew member in close proximity to the HSA's for normal
work in the shuttle bay. It is concluded that radiation shielding will not be required
to protect personnel in the shuttle.
5.4 POTENTIAL MISSION ACCIDENTS
Accidents and aborts which have a potential effect on nuclear safety may be encoun-
tered in any of the mission phases. Some of the resultant accident environments follow
directly after or represent the immediate result at the time of an accident or abort,
such as the blast wave and the liquid propellant fireball or solid propellant fire re-
sulting from a shuttle catastrophic failure. Most of the remaining accident environ-
ments will be experienced by the HSA or Heat Source at times considerably later than
the initiating event and will be directly influenced by the HSA or Heat Source design;
these include the unplanned re-entry of the HSA or Heat Source as a result of a mission
abort after launch or a decay from an operational orbit. Other accident environments
may occur as a result of an operational failure of the Mini-Brayton Power Conversion
System itself, such as loss of gas loop integrity resulting in a Heat Source overtem-
perature condition. These potential mission accidents are summarized in Figure 5-5
and are discussed below.
5.4.1 GROUND HANDLING ACCIDENTS
Ground handling includes all operations involving the Heat Source up to the time at
which it is installed in the shuttle. Included are ground transportation, storage, and
assembly of the Heat Source into the HSA. Postulated accidents are as follows:
5-8
24- 3.5m I j1 18,3m
* 75 REM/YR TO BONE MARROW
(6.25MREM/HR) MAX PERMISSIBLE FROM HEAT SOtJRCE)
20
2 2400Wt EACH HEAT SOURCE
NUMBER OF MHW
S15 - Pu-238 HEAT SOURCES
z
0
0 101
a <
S I I I I I I 10
5-
O 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
SEPARATION DISTANCE - METERS
Figure 5-4. Radiation Exposure Limits for Mini-Brayton Power System
GROUND HANDLING PRELAUNCH & COUNTDOWN LAUNCH AND INSERT
INTO ORB IT
* HS DROPPED * LAUNCH PAD EXPLOSION 6 EXPLOSION AND FIRE AT LOW
e TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS AND FIRE ALTITUDE
IMPACT a FAILURE OF COOLING GSE * RE-ENTRY OF PM
EXPLOSION * OVERTEMPERATURE OF HEAT
- FIRE SOURCE
* STORAGE ACCIDENTS
- EXPLOSION
- FIRE
TRANSFER POWER OPERATE POWER TRANSFER POWER
ORB ITAL CHECKOUT MODULE FROM MODULE IN - MODULE OR HS TO
SHUTTLE SPACECRAFT SHUTTLE
* EXPLOSION AND FIRE @ FAILURE TO REMOVE PM @ SPACECRAFT * FAILURE TO REMOVE PM OR
* POWER MODULE FAILS FROM PAYLOAD BAY FAILURE HS FROM SPACECRAFT
TO START UP * FAILURE TO MATE PM TO * POWER MODULE a FAILURE TO PLACE PM OR
SPACECRAFT FAILURES HS IN PAYLOAD BAY
* SHUTTLE COLLISION a SHUTTLE COLLISION WITH
WITH SPACECRAFT SPACECRAFT
* INORBITEXPLOSION @ INORBIT EXPLOSION
* RE-ENTRY OF PM a RE-ENTRY OF PM
e RE-ENTRY OF HS s RE-ENTRY OF HS
RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY
* FAILURE TO PERFORM DE-ORBIT BURN
e UNCONTROLLED SHUTTLE RE-ENTRY
* CRASH LANDING
e FAILURE OF COOLING GSE AFTER LANDING
* PM OR HS DROPPED DURING REMOVAL FROM SHUTTLE
Figure 5-5. Potential Mission Accidents
1. HSA Assembly Accident - During the assembly operations, the Heat Source
may be dropped while it is being installed in the HSA. Because of the present
design characteristics of the MHW Heat Source, no radiological hazard is
considered credible.
2. Transportation Accidents - Because of the present design characteristics of
the MHW Heat Source no radiological hazard arising from transportation
accidents is considered credible.
3. Storage Accidents - Various accidents (natural disasters, fire, etc. ) are
possible during the storage periods both before arrival at and while at the
launch site. During these periods the Heat Source is contained in its shipping
cask. Because of the protection afforded by the shipping cask, and the fact
that the environments are less extreme than those to which the Heat Source
will survive, no radiological hazard is considered likely.
4. Heat Source or HSA Dropped During Installation on Spacecraft - Because of
a mechanical failure or human error, the Heat Source or HSA may be dropped
while it is being installed on the spacecraft. Because of the low drop heights
involved with this type accident, no radiological hazard is identified.
The accident environments identified during these phases of the mission prior to pre-
launch are less severe than the MHW design criteria, hence there are no radiological
hazards and no impact on the Mini-Brayton HSA design.
5.4. 2 PRELAUNCH AND COUNTDOWN ACCIDENTS
Prelaunch and countdown covers the period from installation of the Heat Source on the
pad to boost ignition.
Accidents in this phase can be initiated during fueling, checkout, countdown and ignition
operations. Non-catastrophic accidents are ignored because the Heat Source can be
retrieved intact. Catastrophic failures result in an explosion followed by liquid and/or
solid propellant fires. The explosion subjects the HSA to a shock overpressure and
impulse environment. A fire subsequent to the explosion is also possible. A liquid
propellant fire can subject the HSA to a fireball environment. Subsequent collapse of
the shuttle vehicle and/or release of the HSA can immerse the HSA in a liquid propel-
lant afterfire or a solid propellant fire.
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The environments resulting from accidents in this phase are:
1. Explosion
2. Liquid propellant fire
3. Solid propellant fire
4. Impact
5. Fragmentation
The explosion (blast overpressure), fire and fragmentation environments are not yet
well defined for the shuttle. Estimates, however, have been made for these potential
accident environments based on other launch vehicles. It is likely that following an
explosion on the launch pad the HSA or Heat Source will be separated from the Shuttle
and will fall on the concrete launch pad or soil surrounding the pad. These impacts
will be relatively low velocity impacts - considerably less than reentry terminal ve-
locities for which the Heat Source is designed to survive. The HSA or Heat Source
can also possibly fall in pools of deluge water which collect on the launch pad as a
result of the large volume of water sprayed onto the pad and tower for fire control.
The potential radiological hazard, if any, is being evaluated on the Multi-Hundred
Watt RTG Program and will be assessed for impact on Mini-Brayton safety require-
ments.
5. 4. 2. 1 Explosion Blast Overpressure
The estimated static and reflective overpressure fields as a function of distance and
explosive yields (equivalent percent of TNT) are given in Figures 5-6 and 5-7. The
estimated reflected impulse is shown in Figure 5-8. The curves given for 32% yield
are considered to be applicable to a Shuttle explosion. A preliminary evaluation of
the MHW Heat Source design indicates that it is probable that it will survive the over-
pressure environment without release of fuel. Further analysis of the Heat Source
capability as well as the overpressure environment however is required to be definitive
on the probability that the nuclear fuel will be contained in the higher blast overpres-
sure that is anticipated for the Shuttle.
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Figure 5-8. Shuttle Blast Reflected Impulse
5. 4. 2. 2 Explosion - Fire
Fire environments resulting from an on-pad accident may result in ignition of the
liquid and/or solid propellants in the shuttle. A liquid propellant fire is character-
ized by a fireball which can envelop the shuttle; the estimated temperature (see Fig-
ure 5-9) falls off rapidly from ~30000 K (49400 F) as the fireball dissipates in about
14 seconds, and remains essentially constant at 12970 K (18750 F) during the 30 minute
afterfire. Also shown on Figure 5-9 for comparison is the Titan IIIC fireball tem-
perature profile. Here the fireball dissipates in about 7. 5 seconds.
A solid propellant fire is characterized by burning of segments of the solid fuel.
Temperatures are estimated to remain constant at approximately 26000 K (42200 F)
for about 10 minutes.
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If a free intact Heat Source or Heat Source Assembly is exposed to the high tempera-
ture Titan IIIC environment or is in contact with burning solid propellant segments,
no radiological hazard will occur as discussed in Paragraph 5. 2. It has also been
determined that if an individual FSA falls and remains on a segment of burning solid
fuel, breach of the fuel containment will not occur. No breach will occur if the FSA
is between burning solid propellant pieces. It has also been determined analytically
(Reference 2) that no release of isotope fuel will occur if an FSA is enveloped in a
Titan IIIC liquid fireball. No analysis has yet been made to determine the effect of
the longer lasting fireball postulated for the shuttle on the survivability of the HSA,
Heat Source or FSA's when exposed directly to the fireball. It is considered however,
that the thermal inertia of these components will sufficiently attenuate the effect of the
larger integrated fireball flux.
5. 4. 2. 3 Explosion - Fragmentation
High velocity fragments resulting from a shuttle explosion presents a potential hazard
to the isotope Heat Source. Fragmentation can originate from propellant tanks in both
forward and aft regions of the shuttle and can breach an unprotected HSA and Heat
Source.
Table 5-1 summarizes these shuttle explosion centers and the estimated fragmentation
environment. The orbiter configuration and propellant quantities were obtained from
Reference 6. Five explosion centers are identified, viz, the external boost liquid fuel
tanks between the LO2 and LH2 bulkheads, the orbit reaction control hydrazine tanks
in the forward section of the orbiter, the LO2 and LH2 line connections from the ex-
ternal tanks to the orbiter main engines at the rear of the orbiter, the left and right
rear external hydrazine orbit reaction control system orbiter tanks, and the left and
right external pod orbit maneuvering orbiter fuel tank. Both primary and secondary
fragmentation sources are estimated, the secondary sources being defined as those
fragments that result from secondary effects of the explosion, eg., release of fasten-
ers due to failure of structure or due to collision with primary fragments from the
explosion center.
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TABLE 5-1. POSSIBLE EXPLOSION SOURCES AND ESTIMATED EFFECTS
Inherent Fragment Protection for Fuel
Overpressures Fragmentation Source Fragment Velocities Containers
Explosalon Propellant Secondary
Center Amount Yield Static Reflected Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Fragments Fragments
l1 1,1715,0004 32'1, 5000 psi S0.000 psi * 2024 connecting skirt be- Crushed orbiting <5000'/sec Estimated Excellent Poor
LH2  20' @20' tween Lo 2 and LH2 tanks vehicle - high 10 <1500' see Difficult path into Crushing of major
LO02 Est. Est. s Estimated 20' of 2219 deflection and Est. for fractured cargo area for frag- rings - inner chords
either side of explosion fracturing of steel/alum/ ments from exploston in tension breaking
Note: These values center rings, frames, titanium area, gnrticularly in and releasing hi
Sare approximately * 2219 tanks are welded supports, wing fastners,. area of wing carry strength fastners
< 2 times those in construaion. Milled carry thru, <2000'/se thr structure, main inward - relatively
22 Sepj. 72 design skins, machined rings longerons, etc. support even though small size hi velo-
z review . 2024 skirt assembled a Release of structure is crushed. city, dense fast-
with mech. fastners high strength ners - no inherent
Milled skins, formed fastners protection except
SRM/TANK and machined rings * Possible Poo shell, heat
FORWARDATTACH scissors effect exchanger, and
Mini-Brayton
radiator.
TANK/ORBITER
FORWARD ATTACII 1 2 Hydrazine 2'7 to 5'E Est. Low Low Tanks and fittings Local crushing of Estimated Estimated Excellent x Fellent
*3000 Adjacent bulkhead shell aft of bulk- <2000'/see <500'sec Several bulkheads
a Nose structure and head equipment, etc. in
ORBITER skin (hydrpath to cargo compart
£1. fhydraaine enpe- t.
alon could insti-
tute other ex-
plosion)
3 R and LO Low Law Bulkhead structure Negligible (could Estimated Negligible Fair Poor
2 (end bulkhead of institute other <2000'/sec Single bulkhead But secondary frag-
Leakage or cargo compartment) explosions) separates explosin ments negligibli
-- line ruumre center from cargo unless other explo.
compartment. in aft sect initiated.
*4 [lydrazine 27 to 5', Est. Low Low a Pod structure tanks Release of Estimated <500'/see Fair INr
Stotal and fittings possibly fastners from <2000' see Estimated Single bulkhead No protection
St end bulkhead to cargo end bulkhead separates explosion except as in 1.
TANK/ORBITER SRM/TANK c Est.ompartment (could isti ceer from 
cargo
othr explosionst lomprtmest.
AFT ATTACH (2) AFT ATTACHI 
#5 Nitrogen 21' to 5'T Est. Low <40 psi at * Pod structure tanks. Local crushing of Estimated <l 5010'see Fair Poor
0 Tetroxide 20' range fittings possiblv shell. Possible < 3000,sec stimats d Single bulkhead No protection
(estimated) end bulkhead to cargo release of fasners at soure separates explosion except as in 1.
Monomethyl- compartment (could institute center from cargo
Hydrazine other explosions) compartment.
M z 24,400# total
a 0 (12,000o/side)
1n
5. 4. 2. 3. 1 Explosion Center - 1 External Boost Tank - Origins of fragments from
this explosion center are depicted in Figure 5-10 and are as follows:
1. High velocity fragments - near radial trajectory from 2024 cylindrical
skirt section connecting LO2 and LH 2 tanks.
2. Fragments from LH2 dome - lower velocity (estimated 920 m/sec
(3000 ft/sec) range).
3. Fragments from LH 2 tank section - 6 meters (20 ft) below joint - estimated
velocity range 460 m/sec (1500 ft/sec).
4. Fragments from the remainder of tank resulting from massive tearing,
peeling and collapse under the explosion pressurized head of fuel and
external static/reflected pressures from the explosion.
The effect of these particles on the orbiter are listed below:
1. Primary Fragmentation from External Tank and Skirt Section - In time for
fragments to travel beyond the payload compartment (0. 05 sec range), the
orbiter remains close to external tank. Those particles traveling into the
orbiter payload compartment path are expected to be at relatively low
velocity, 460 m/sec (1500 ft/sec). The path for primary fragmentation
into the payload compartment is blocked by floor frames, floor wing carry
through structures, bulkheads, landing gear support structure, etc.
2. Secondary Fragmentation
a. Direct impact of fragments on fasteners and fittings of the orbiter
structure may release secondary fragments which will travel at
lower velocities.
b. Massive collapse of the orbiter structure caused by static and reflected
overpressures may release fasteners.
Expected fragments are steel/titanium/aluminum fasteners up to 0. 95
cm dia x 2. 54 cm (0. 375 dia x 1 inch)long with velocities up to 460 m/sec
(1500 ft/sec).
If one assumes 500 fragments as an expectation of the number of primary
particles originating from the explosion center, and that these are dis-
tributed uniformly in a sphere, then only about four particles will impact
the 6. 1 m (20 ft) front bulkhead of the orbiter which is located 18. 3 m
(60 ft) from the explosion center. The majority of these, if not all,
should be stopped or the velocity greatly reduced, by the nose section.
It must be assumed, however, that some deflected fragments such as
released fasteners will enter the payload bay at velocities up to 610
m/sec (2000 ft/sec).
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Figure 5-10. Estimated Primary Fragment Velocities and Overpressures from External Tank Explosion
5. 4. 2. 3. 2 Explosion Center 2 - Orbiter Forward Section - As indicated in Table 5-1,
the overpressure and fragmentation environment from an explosion of the Orbit Re-
action Control Tanks is estimated to be far less severe than that from an external tank
explosion.
5. 4. 2. 3. 3 Explosion Centers 3, 4 and 5 - Rear and Aft RCS and Orbit Maneuvering
Fuel Tanks - Figure 5-11 depicts the estimated path and velocities of fragments from
an aft tank explosion and also shows the overpressure environment from a simultaneous
external tank booster explosion. Maximum velocities of -910 m/sec (3000 ft/sec) are
estimated at the explosion source. These should be attenuated to -610 m/sec (2000 ft/
sec) after passing through shuttle orbiter structure.
5. 4. 2. 3. 4 Location of HSA within Shuttle Payload Bay - It is desirable to locate and
orient the HSA within the 60 foot shuttle bay so that the blast overpressure is not ex-
cessive and the projected target area for fragments is minimized. Because of the
large reflected overpressures that result from an external tank explosion (Figure 5-10)
the HSA should be located as far aft in the payload bay as possible. Since the manipu-
lator boom in the payload bay has a 15 meter (50 foot) radius, this would appear to be
the most aft position possible for the HSA. At this point the maximum pressure is
approximately 3440 N/cm2 (5000 psi), well within the survivability capability of an
FSA. (The pressure generated during an impact of an FSA at 88 m/sec (290 ft/second),
is a 19,300 N/cm 2 (28,000 psi) which an FSA can survive (Reference 7). Overpres-
sures generated by aft tank explosions are less than 27. 5 N/cm2 (40 psi) at the payload
bay location (Reference 7).
Most of the higher velocity fragments within the payload bay resulting from an explo-
sion will be traveling essentially in a forward or aft direction. From this it is con-
cluded that the optimum orientation of the HSA to minimize the damage from fragmenta-
tion is one in which the HSA axis is parallel to the shuttle longitudinal axis.
The Mini-Brayton radiator, HSA structure and HSHX will afford some protection to the
Heat Source by attenuating impinging fragments. It has been estimated, however, that
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attenuation will not be sufficient to prevent a potential radiological hazard and it is
concluded that fragmentation shielding will be required. Such shielding can be de-
signed either as an individual shield surrounding the HSA or provided as an external
shield surrounding the entire Mini-Brayton power module. The latter concept will
present a simpler integration problem than the former but undoubtedly will be heavier.
Clearly further evaluation of the potential fragmentation environment based on a more
detailed definition of shuttle structure and explosive yields is required before a final
evaluation of Mini-Brayton shield requirements can be made.
5.4.3 ASCENT AND IN-ORBIT ACCIDENTS
Explosions during ascent or while in orbit will impose less severe conditions on the
heat source than those which might occur during the pre-launch phase. Aborts during
ascent or during orbit transfer of the Mini-Brayton to or from the shuttle can result
in an unplanned re-entry and impact. The survivability of the Heat Source under these
conditions is discussed in the next section.
5.4.4 RE-ENTRY
There are a myriad of potential reentry conditions that can occur as results of aborts
taking place in the mission after launch. An exhaustive analysis has been conducted
on the MHW-RTG program to determine the survivability of a free unencumbered Heat
Source for a spectrum of reentry conditions. It has been determined (Reference 2)
that the Heat Source will survive re-entry through the atmosphere with no release of
isotope fuel for the following initial conditions.
1. Altitude - 121, 920 m (400,000 ft)
2. Initial velocity: 7300-11000 m/sec (24,000-36,333 ft/sec).
3. Path angle to the local horizontal: 0O to -90 .
Neither failure of the aeroshell nor melting of the PICS will occur for any combination
of the conditions above which include super-orbital and multiple skip reentries. In
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the present study a preliminary analysis was conducted to determine if fuel release
would occur for reentry of a complete HSA. The assumptions made are as follows:
1. HSA is complete, but separate from Mini-Brayton Power System
2. Entry configuration is side-on stable
3. Emergency cooling has functioned properly, the doors are opened and the
insulation is intact
4. Entry starts (time = 0) at 122 km (400 K feet) with a velocity of 7600 m/sec
(25, 000 fps) and a "down" angle of 0. 050 .
These assumptions were used along with HSA weights of 68, 56 and 45 kg (150 lb,
125 lb, and 100 lb) to determine the trajectory of the HSA through the atmosphere.
The geometry was held constant, yielding values of W/A of 325, 267 and 216 kg/m 2
(66. 0, 54. 5, and 44. 0 lb/ft2). The drag coefficient, Cd, based on cylinder geometry
varies with each number and altitude as shown in Figures 5-12 and 5-13.
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The results of the reentry trajectory analyses are shown on Figure 5-14 which pre-
sents the altitude vs time profile. Only one curve is shown since there was no signif-
icant difference in all three profiles except at the very end of the trajectory. The
heavier assembly impacts the earliest, at 867 seconds, and the lightest impacts last,
at 917 seconds. However, the major deviation in these trajectories all came at low
altitudes and low velocities. Therefore, thermodynamically they were not significantly
different, each having similar heating profiles through the peak heating condition. To
be conservative, the higher heating rate data from the heavier system was used in the
analysis. Figure 5-15 presents the normalized heat flux profile based on a "spinning"
cylinder. The HSA does not actually spin; this was just a means of obtaining average
heat flux data more readily. The actual input to the thermal analysis program used a
value twice the average rate applied to only half the surface.
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Figure 5-14. HSA Re-entry Trajectory
A 16 nodal model was used in the transient temperature analysis and the results are
shown in Figure 5-16. The initial temperatures are equilibrium temperatures with
the emergency cooling doors open; during the time of an orbit decay to 400, 000 feet,
steady state temperatures conditions would prevail. Data is given for the outer
structural shell, the heat exchanger and the heat source only since the insulation
burns off rapidly once the outer layer reaches its melting point. The insulation is
removed in 20 seconds from the time the first section comes off.
The HSA structural container shell responds quite rapidly to the heat flux with the
insulation gone. Its large mass in conjunction with the short time left before.peak
heating, results in a maximum temperature well below its melt point (28000 K
(46000 F)).
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The thermal inertia of the structure provides ample protection for the heat exchanger
and heat source which do not show any significant change in temperature throughout
the re-entry period.
It can be concluded from this simplified analysis that the margin exhibited in the
response of the heat source shows that even if heating rates are significantly higher,
the heat source temperature will still be well within safe limits that preclude fuel
release.
5.4.5 MINI-BRAYTON SAFETY GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS
This section presents a summary of the major safety design requirements and guide-
lines that directly affect the HSA design and shuttle interfaces. Detail requirements
and guidelines are given in Appendix B in a format which relates the requirement or
guideline to a mission phase and operational function, and allocates the requirement
to particular hardware or operations.
1. Heat Source Safety Design Requirements
a. Provide fireball, solid fire and blast over-pressure protection to pre-
clude any radiological hazard in the event of an on-pad explosion (the
most severe explosion environments).
b. Provide the capability of the Heat Source to withstand the reentry en-
vironment from earth orbital decay in a free body (HS alone) configura-
tion, an HSA configuration and a power module configuration. Included
is the capability of the Heat Source to withstand impact as a free body
on a hard surface at terminal velocity. Satisfaction of this design re-
quirement will assure that no isotope fuel release to the biosphere
occurs during an unplanned reentry.
c. Provide the capability of the Heat Source to survive a shuttle crash
landing. Since crash landing velocities have not yet been defined it
must be determined at a later date that no radiological hazard would
occur in the event of this accident mode.
d. Limit exposed surface temperatures to less than 466. 50K (3800F) during
pre-launch on pad operations to prevent accidental ignition of booster
fuels.
e. Provide an emergency cooling system to limit Heat Source temperatures
to safe levels at any time during the mission in the event of any failure
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that could cause a Heat Source overtemperature. Typical failures that
might occur are shuttle operational failures that delay deployment and
operation of the Mini-Brayton system after launch, failure of Mini-
Brayton Power Conversion Components in orbit, forced landing of the
shuttle, etc.
2. Shuttle Safety Guidelines
a. Provide a heat sink capability for rejecting 7200 watts of heat from the
Mini-Brayton system during any mission phase when the system or the
Heat Source may be in the payload bay.
b. Provide at least a two (2) week supply of coolant for auxiliary cooling
of the Heat Source following a forced landing of the shuttle.
5-28
SECTION 6
HSA DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
6.1 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The HSA shall be designed to be used singly, or in multiples of two or three in a
parallel configuration, for the following conditions:
Number of HSA Units in Parallel
1 2 3
HSHX Inlet Temperature
oK ( oF) 989 (1320) 990 (1322) 992 (1326)
HSHX Outlet Temperature 1153 (1615) 1153 (1615) 1153 (1615)
oK( oF)
Flow Rate .0565 (.125) .113 (0. 249) .175 (0. 387)
Kg/sec (lb/sec)
Outlet Pressure 24.7 (35.9) 50.2 (72.8) 78.4 (113.9)
N/cm2 (psia)
Maximum Pressure Drop Across
HSHX AP .006 .003 .002
P
As a design goal, the outer surface (emissivity sleeve) of the heat source shall not
exceed 1283"K (18500 F) during steady state operation. The same heat source used
in the MHW RTC can operate at 13660K (20000F), hence this goal provides a healthy
design margin.
The HSA shall be designed for a 5 year operational mission in space vacuum with
the capability of removing the heat source in space as indicated in paragraph 1.5.
6.2 NON-OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
During non-operational periods at the launch site, the Auxiliary Cooling Subsystem
must be capable of limiting any surface of the HSA which is exposed to the external
environment to temperature not exceeding 466. 50K (3800F). This is a safety require-
ment (see paragraph 5. 1) to preclude accidental ignition of spacecraft or booster
fuels. Furthermore the ACS must be capable of limiting the outer graphite surface
of the Heat Source to a temperature not exceeding- 5000K (4400F) to prevent oxida-
tion of the graphite.
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If the Mini-Brayton is started up on the pad, an inert cover gas for the Heat Source
must be provided to preclude oxidation of the graphite sleeve at operating tempera-
tures. At the same time the safety requirement pertaining to exposed surfaces
being less than 466. 50K (3800F) must be satisfied.
6.3 EMERGENCY COOLING REQUIREMENTS
The Emergency Cooling Subsystem must be capable of limiting Heat Source Tempera-
tures to safe levels at anytime during the mission in the event of any failure that
could cause a Heat Source overtemperature. Typical of such failures are delays
in deploying and starting up the Mini-Brayton system after launch, failure of power
conversion components such as the BRU, in orbit, crash landing of the shuttle in
remote areas with the HSA aboard, etc.
Specifically, the Emergency Cooling Subsystem must be capable of limiting the outer
surface of the Heat Source to a maximum steady state temperature of no greater than
14900K (22230 F). This surface temperature results in a PuO2 - Iridium interface
temperature of a Heat Source Post Impact Containment Shell of 1773 K (27320 F);
this has been established on the MHW program as the maximum permissible long
term PICS temperature.
For a short transient duration of the order of 5 minutes, the outer Heat Source
temperature may be permitted to reach a maximum of 1922'K (38100 F). This
temperature corresponds to a maximum PICS temperature of 23720 K (38100 F)
which is the upper test limit conducted on the MHW program.
6.4 GROUND TEST REQUIREMENTS
The HSA shall be designed for a continuous 2 year ground test (in the Power System
configuration.) It would be highly desirable to conduct the test completely in an
air environment. If, however, this compromises the operational performance,
either an inert gas or vacuum environment will be provided for the HSA.
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SECTION 7
MATERIAL SELECTION
The high temperature environment within the Heat Source Assembly insulation blanket
enclosure dictates careful selection of materials for HSA components. The consid-
erations herein apply to the Heat Source Heat Exchanger, its manifolding and headers,
the Auxiliary Cooling System manifolding, the Heat Source and HSHX support structure,
the HSA support structure and in general to all components inside the insulation
enclosure.
7.1 SELECTION CRITERIA
7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS
The major requirements that materials for the Heat Source Heat Exchanger and
structural components of the HSA must satisfy are as follows:
1. Materials must be capable of sustaining a vacuum environment for at least
five years. The effects of a high temperature vacuum environment on
materials, i. e., evaporation, is a major selection criteria.
2. Material must exhibit and maintain requisite strength at operating tempera-
tures under the conditions of (1) above. High temperature components must
be capable of operating at 12550 K (18000 F) in vacuum. Melting temperature
must be substantially higher.
3. Materials must be capable of undergoing multiple thermal cycles between
room temperature and operational temperatures during ground tests. Fifty
cycles has been selected as a preliminary criterion.
4. HSHX materials must be compatible with the Mini-Brayton working fluid,
helium-xenon.
5. All HSA materials must be mutually compatible with each other and with other
interfacing materials in the Mini-Brayton Power Conversion System.
6. The HSA, as designed for space flight operation, must be capable of under-
going a continuous 2-year ground test. This requirement is not interpreted
as a limitation on test approach. For example, if it is deemed appropriate
and feasible, flight equipment can be tested in a vacuum chamber or in an
inert environment.
7. Materials must not be adversely affected by the nuclear radiation from the
isotope fuel.
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7.1.2 SELECTION CRITERIA
Candidate materials that meet the above requirements are compared and evaluated
based on the following criteria.
1. Weight - Minimum weight is a goal. Both material density and structural
strength, in particular creep strength at operating temperature, determine
the weight of an HSA component. Structural gages are governed by the
strength of the material, and weight is proportional to the product of density
and material thickness. One percent creep stress at operating temperature
over five years is used to size components. In some instances fabrication
considerations may be the limiting factor on structural gages and in these
cases it becomes a prime factor in determining weight.
2. Structural Stability - Because of the 5-year operation requirement at high
temperature, effects of stress time deformation resulting from long term
creep of the structure is a very significant design consideration in material
selection. In addition, large temperature differentials between structural
components dictate a strong preference for low thermal expansion materials.
Optimum material selection will minimize thermally induced stresses both
during operation and during the transient warm-up period prior to opera-
tional conditions.
3. Fabricability - The high reliability required for five-year power operation
is directly related to the complexity and reliability of the fabrication of high
temperature components such as the HSHX, especially for the class of
materials applicable to the HSA design. The ease of forming and working
to required shapes, the joining characteristics, especially weldability and
joint properties, the availability and long term compatibility of braze alloys,
and general fabrication experience are all factors in the selection of materials
that will result in a highly reliable fabricated assembly.
4. Thermo-optical Properties and Coatability on Surface Treatments - A HSA
design goal is to minimize Heat Source operating temperature. The emissivity
of the HSHX surrounding the Heat Source will have a direct effect on the Heat
Source temperature, consequently a high HSHX emissivity is desirable. The
emissivity of the parent material and/or the ability to coat or treat the HSHX
surface to obtain a stable high emissivity is therefore a consideration in
material selection.
5. Cost and Availability - Material cost is a significant factor if there are large
differences between material costs and if these costs are a significant fraction
of the overall HSA cost. Since the MHW heat source will cost on the order
of 2 million dollars, a factor of 2. 5% or $50,000 has been selected as the
threshold at which material costs are considered significant.
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Availability is a consideration in so far as the stock types (sheet, tubes, etc.)
available and the development status of the material. The prime candidates
considered are available in the forms required for HSA fabrication, hence
no problems in this regard are anticipated.
6. Material Characterization - The extent of existing material characterization
(known properties and behavior) at the particular temperature and lifetime
duration of the HSA is another factor in selecting a material. The degree of
data available is directly related to the amount of experience with the material.
It is recognized that where specific data is lacking for an otherwise attractive
candidate, the data can be provided by an appropriate test program. In this
regard, lack of complete material characterization has not been a criteria
for eliminating a candidate and where necessary data has been extrapolated
to make preliminary evaluations.
7.1.3 CANDIDATE MATERIALS
The high operating temperatures of the HSA limit candidate materials to three classes
of material, viz:
1. Superalloys
2. Refractory alloys
3. Refractory noble metals and alloys.
Superalloy candidates are classified as cobalt base alloys and nickel base alloys. Re-
fractory alloy candidates are classified as columbium base alloys and tantalum base
alloys. The refractory noble metal and alloys are rhodium, iridium, platinum and the
binary and ternary platinum alloys. The chemical compositions of the materials
considered for the HSA are given in Table 7-la, b and c. This initial list was limited
to the medium strength refractory alloys which exhibit adequate strength for the HSA
design and which are easier to work than the higher strength refractory alloys. The
superalloy candidates are well representative of the spectrum of alloys which are
commonly used for high temperature applications.
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TABLE 7-1. CANDIDATE MATERIAL COMPOSITIONS
TABLE 7-la. SUPERALLOY COMPOSITION (WEIGHT PERCENT)
Elements
Alloys Th02 C Mn Cr Ni W Fe Si Co La Cb Mo Al S Cu Ti
Cobalt Base
Alloys
HA-25 (L-605) -- .05-.15 1.0-20 19.0-21 9.0-11.0 14.0-16.0 3.0 <1.0 Bal -- -- --
HA-188 -- .08 0.75 22.0 22.0 14.0 1.5 0.20 Bal .08
Nickel Base
Alloys
Hastelloy-X -- .05-.15 1.0 20.5-23 Bal .2-1.0 17-20 1.0 -- -- -- 8-10
Inconel-750 -- .04 0.70 15.0 Bal -- 6.75 0.30 -- -- .85 -- .80 .007 .05 2.5
TD Nickel 2 Bal
TABLE 7-1b. REFRACTORY ALLOY (WEIGHT PERCENT)
Alloys (Nb) Zr Hf T Y Ti W C
Columbium (Niobium)
Base Alloys
Cb-1 Zr Bal 0.08-1.2 -- --
Cb-129Y Bal 0.5 9.0-11 0.5 1. 0-0.4 -- 9.0-11 --
Cb-103 Bal 0.7 10.0 0.5 -- 0.7-1.3 0.5 --
FS-85 Bal 0.6-1.1 -- 25-29 -- -- 10.0-12 --
Cb-752 Bal 2. 0-3.0 -- -- -- -- 9.0-11 --
Tantalm Base Alloys
T-11 -- 1.8-2.4 Bal -- -- 7.0-9
T-222 -- -- 2.2-2.8 Bal -- -- 9.6-11.2 .008-. 0173
Ta-10 -- -- -- Bal -- -- 9. 0-11. 0 --
TABLE 7-1c. REFRACTORY NOBLE METALS AND ALLOY COMPOSITION (WEIGHT PERCENT)
Elements
Metal/Alloy Rh Ir Pt W
Binary Pt Alloys
Pt-1ORh 10 90
Pt-20Rh 20 80
Pt-30Rh 30 70
Pt-25Ir 25 75
Ternary Pt Alloys
Pt 26Rh 8W 26 66 8
Pt 3ORh 10W 30 60 10
7.2 SUPERALLOYS
7.2.1 EVAPORATION PROBLEM
For long term missions (five years or more) a general rule dictates that materials
should not be used at temperatures above which their vapor pressure exceeds 10 - 7 torr.
In examining the vapor pressure of the elements listed below in Table 7-2, that are
contained in the superalloys, it can be TABLE 7-2. VAPOR PRESSURE
seen that they would be limited to short OF ELEMENTS
time missions in the vacuum of space at Vapor Pressure
temperatures in excess of 13110 K Element Torr at 13110 K (19000 F)
(19000 F). Although this temperature is Manganese 10-1
higher than anticipated HSA operating Chromium 2 x 10 - 5
Nickel 10-6
temperatures, it is considered a reason-
Iron 10 - 6
able criterion for evaluation. Alloys Cobalt 3 x 10 - 7
Titanium 4 x 10-8
containing chromium, nickel, iron or 11
Platinum 10-11
manganese will require a protective Columbium 10-14
Zirconium 10-14
coating to suppress excessive evaporation Hafnium 1 - 15
in space. The data given in Figure 7-1 Tantalum 10-15
(Reference 9) for example, indicates that Tungsten 10-15
the continuous evaporation losses from HA-25 (L-605) and Inconel at 11450 K (16000 F)
and 12550K (18000 F) respectively, constitute loss rates higher than can be tolerated
for a five-year mission.
Based on the composition of HA-188 and Hastelloy-X it can be concluded that their
evaporation rate falls within the range given in Figure 7-1. The elements which have
the highest evaporation rate are chromium, nickel and manganese and since their
chemical activity and solid solutioning characteristics are high, it is possible that they
will degrade surrounding materials or change their properties. Figure 7-1 also shows
that the loss rate becomes constant after about 50 hours. This would indicate that the
rate of evaporation of the higher vapor pressure elements becomes diffusion rate
limited.
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Figure 7-1. Evaporation Losses of Iron, Nickel, and Cobalt-Base Alloys (at
872 and 9820 C at approximately 5 x 10- 7 to 5 x 10 9 torr.)
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The vapor blockage phenomena of an enclosed configuration like the HSA may reduce
evaporation rates. However this cannot be accurately predicted and consequently can-
not be relied upon as a design feature. Furthermore since the vapor pressure of the
evaporating constituents are highly temperature dependent, temperature differences of
the order of 1000 K within the HSA enclosure may prevent a vapor blockage phenomenon
from occurring. For example, chromium vapor pressure drops from 2. 5 x 10-6 torr
to 1 x 10 - 7 with a temperature change from 12730 K to 11730 K. Chromium would
evaporate from a "hot" surface in the HSA and recondense at a "cooler" surface, pro-
viding a path within the HSA for the evaporation process.
Formation of oxides on the surface of superalloys during prelaunch would have the
initial effect of slowing the rate of evaporation in space. At temperatures above 12000 K
(17000 F) in vacuum, chromium oxide (Cr20 3 ) undergoes dissociation so that the char-
acteristic rate of evaporation would be re-established in time. It is possible to inhibit
evaporation by plasma arc coating the surface of superalloys with a high emissivity
coating such as Radifrax, RC 356. This coating was successfully applied to the surface
of the SNAP 27 heat source, fabricated from HA25 (L-605) alloy, and to the SNAP 27
hot frame fabricated from Inconel 102, primarily to provide a high emissivity (. 85 to .9)
and to inhibit evaporation. The composition of this coating is the following:
Iron Titanate. . ................ 60 w/o (weight-percent)
Calcium Titanate .............. 30 w/o
Silicon Dioxide ................ 10 w/o
The degree to which the above coating will inhibit evaporation at temperatures above
12000 K (17000 F) remains to be experimentally established.
7.2.2 SUPERALLOY OXIDATION
Oxidation of superalloys takes place in air above 9780K (13000 F). As the surface oxide
builds up in thicknesses to about 0. 050 to 0. 075 mm (0. 002 to 0. 003 inches), the high
density oxide layer forms a barrier against further oxidation of the substrate metal.
While this characteristic would permit the use of superalloys for ground testing in air
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environments, the instability of the oxides in vacuum at the HSA operational tempera-
ture would preclude dependence upon it as a barrier to evaporation in space.
The oxidation rates of the candidate superalloys at 13660K (20000 F) are given below:
Rate in Dry Air
Alloy 1366 0 K (20000 F)
HA-188 20 mpy*
HA25 (L-605) 92 mpy
Hastelloy-X 25 mpy
Inconel-750 103 mpy
TD Nickel 150 mpy
*Mils per year
The buildup of thick oxide layers during a two-year ground test would be undesirable
since it could affect performance. Figure 7-2 shows a comparison of the oxidation
resistance of three alloys as a function of temperature. The HA-188 alloy possesses
the highest stability in an oxidizing environment. While Inconel-625 is not shown, its
composition indicates that it will perform about the same as Hastelloy-X under the
same conditions.
7.2.3 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES
Typical mechanical properties of superalloys are given in Table 7-3. Generally the
superalloys exhibit high strength at moderately high temperatures, however, the
strength falls off rapidly as the temperature increases beyond 11450 K (16000 F). The
development of TD Nickel, containing two percent (by volume) thoria, imparts useful
mechanical properties at elevated temperatures. Beyond ~13660 K (20000 F) the tensile
strength of TD Nickel falls off slowly and remains well beyond the strength of HA-25
HA-188, for example. However in the operating temperature range of the HSA, the
tensile strength of Haynes alloy is greater hence there appears to be no advantage of
considering TD Nickel for this application. The higher ductility of Haynes alloys
renders them more fabricable than TD Nickel and capable of withstanding the higher
induced stress with lower rates of fatigue.
Of the candidate superalloys, the most attractive is HA-188. It possesses the highest
strength at HSA operating temperatures, has excellent ductility and exhibits the lowest
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TABLE 7-3. MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF SUPERALLOYS
Expansion Creep Data (1)
Melting Coefficient Rupture 1
Alloy Density Point Tensile Yield Stress Elongation 10 - 6  10 -  10 3  10 3
gm/cm3  lb/in3  oK N/cm
2  psi N/cm 2  psi % cm/ cm in/in/* F N/cm
2  ksi N/cm 2  ksi
HA25 (L-605) 9. 14 .33 1643 23100 33500 12600 18200 40 16.9 9.4 0.9 1.3 0.55
HA-188 9. 14 .33 1643 25400 36800 15500 22500 72 17.8 9.9 0.9 1.3 0.55
Inconel-750 8.24 .298 1673 6890 10000 3450 5000 90 17.8 9.9 <0. 35 <0.5 -
Hastelloy-X 8.23 .297 1658 13780 20000 11700 17000 45 16.7 9.2 0.55 0.8 0.35 0L5
TD Nickel 8. 92 .322 1727 13780 20000 13780 20000 10 15.3 8.5 4.85 7.0 4.15 6.0
(1) 40,000 Hr. Creep Estimate
rate of oxidation. Creep strength data for the HA-188/HA-25 used in further design
trades is plotted as a function of time at 12550K (18000 F) in Figure 7-3; extrapolation
of data to 5 years is required.
7.3 REFRACTORY ALLOYS
Columbium and tantalum refractory alloys exhibit very high melt temperatures and
good strength characteristics at elevated temperatures beyond 11440 K (16000 F). Their
tensile strength does not fall off as rapidly as the superalloys. In general these alloys
cannot be used in an air oxidizing environment at temperatures in excess of 7000 K
(8000 F). Therefore, it is necessary to provide an inert gas or vacuum environment
in which to carry out ground system testing. Alternately, oxidation can also be pre-
vented by coating these alloys with a defect free oxidation resistant coating. However,
the reliability of such a coating especially for a long term (2 year) ground test is
questionable. Thermal cycling would also have a deleterious effect on coating reliability.
The alloys however, can be used in space vacuum at temperatures up to 19220 K (30000 F)
without significant weight loss and consequently are attractive for long life, high
temperature operation in space. The characteristics of the refractory alloys are
discussed below.
7.3.1 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES
Mechanical properties of the refractory alloys at elevated temperatures are given in
Table 7-4. Some representative strength data is plotted in Figures 7-4, 7-5 and 7-6
for Cb-103, C-129Y and T-111, respectively. They all have reasonably high strength
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TABLE 7-4. MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF REFRACTORY ALLOYS
1255 0 K (18000 F)
Characteristic Melting Strength CoefficientDensity Temperature of Creep Data(1 )
Material gms/cm
3  
'K Tensile Yield Elongation Expansion Rupture
103 N/
2 
KSIN/cm
 
 10 N/cm
2 
KSI 10 cm/cm/'C 10-i' in.in/ F 10
3 
N/cm
2 
KSI 103 N'cm
2 
KSI
Cb-lZr 8.57 2680 18.6 27 6.9 10 20 6.84 3.8 4 5.8 1.24 1.8
Cb-129Y 9.49 2671 36 52 22 32 7.75 4.3 5.85 8.5 1.86 2.7
Cb-103 8.85 2622 24 35 14.5 21 7.75 4.3 4 5.8 1.24 1.8
Cb-752 9.02 2477 38 55 24 35 7.75 4.3 6.9 10 2.28 3.3
T-1ll 16.8 3255 38 55 24 35 6.3 3.5 13.8 20 6.9 10
T-222 17.0 3294 58.5 S5 28 41 6.3 3.5 24.1 35 13.8 20
Ta-10W 16.9 3308 48.5 70 26.2 38 5.4 3.0 17.2 251 10.3 15
(1)40, 000 HR Creep Estimate
at HSA operational temperatures. Because of lower modulus and yield properties,
the columbium alloys can be more readily fabricated into the design shapes of the
HSHX than the tantalum alloys. The higher ductility of columbium also permits the
HSHX to respond more readily to cyclic power system operation during ground tests.
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Figure 7-5. Tensile Properties Cb-129Y-WAH Chang Data
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Figure 7-6. Tensile Properties T-111 Cold Rolled Recrystallized-WAH Chang Data
7.3.2 CREEP DATA
As indicated in paragraph 7. 1, long term high temperature creep strength is an
important trade off parameter in the selection of HSA materials. Some representa-
tive data for refractories is given in Figure 7-7. The shaded area is the region that
applies to T-111; data points for Ta-10W are shown within the band. Also plotted
on Figure 7-7 are individual data points for some of the columbium alloys. It should
be pointed out that some of the test data was obtained by subjecting the materials to
accelerated creep tests at higher than 18000 F for shorter durations of time than
10,000 hours to obtain an equivalent Larson Miller parameter (abscissa of the plot).
Although data for Cb-103 is not shown, its creep strength is expected to be similar
and slightly better than Cb-lZr. It is evident from the data, that the tantalum base
alloys exhibit greater creep strength than the columbium base alloys, but their higher
densities and lower ductility offset this advantage.
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Figure 7-7. Refractory Alloys 1% Creep Properties
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7.4 NOBLE METAL ALLOYS
The noble metal alloys were investigated because they exhibit the attractive feature
of high temperature stability in both oxidizing and vacuum environments. Ground
tests could therefore be conducted in air without requiring a vacuum or inert gas
environment, and the problem of evaporation during space operation would be absent.
Data for the pure noble metals (rhodium, iridium and platinum) indicate that their
low creep strength would preclude their use for HSA components, hence they were
eliminated as candidate materials.
The noble alloys are presently under development and are not nearly as well charac-
terized as the refractory alloys and superalloys, consequently an extensive materials
test program to fully evaluate the materials would be required. Further, the cost
of these materials is extremely high. Comparisons with the other HSA candidate
materials are made in paragraph 7. 5.
7.4. 1 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES
Mechanical Properties for the Noble metal alloys are given in Table 7-5. Creep data
is essentially unavailable for these alloys; however, it is believed that the tungsten
alloyed varieties will behave similar to TZM, the arc cast molybemums, or CB 752.
As such creep data was derived by normalizing these data to the short term tensile
strengths of the related materials. On this basis one would conclude that ternary noble
alloys offer a distinct advantage in creep strength over the binary alloy counterparts.
TABLE 7-5. MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF NOBLE METAL ALLOYS
Coefficient Creel) Strength(1 )
Melting Tensile Yield ofDensity Point Strength Strength Expansion Rupture
Metal/Alloy gm/cm
3  lb/in3  -K N/cm
2  
Psi N/cm
2  Psi 10 - 6 cm/cm/ C 10- 6 in/in/' F 103 N/cm
2  1SI 103 N 'cmn
2  
KSI
Pt30Rh 17.5 .635 2203 24,100 35,000 17,900 26,000 S.S -4.9 0. 69 1.0 0.41 (I.
Pt26Rh8W 17.7 .640 2273 35,800 52,000 26,200 38,000 8.5 4.7 3.65 S.3 U.1- u.2
Pt30Rhl W 18.2 .660 2333 42,600 02,000 29,000 43,000 8.3 4.6 7.03 10.2, 2.2 3.2
(1 )Extrapolation of 1255*K-100 Hr Data to 40,000 hours
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7.5 TRADEOFFS
7. 5. 1 Weight, Structural Stability and Cost
Preliminary structural sizing of the candidate Heat Source Heat Exchanger designs
was performed to evaluate structural and weight characteristics in the selection of
materials. Sizing of the elements is dictated primarily by the one-percent creep
strength limits in order to limit distortion changes and control critical dimensions
during the five-year mission life (-40,000 hours). Since little data is available for
most materials at lifetimes greater than 1000 to 2000 hrs, extrapolations of data
were made to estimate the 40,000 hour creep properties.
Table 7-6 summarizes results of the structural evaluation for a spectrum of candidate
materials and includes estimated material costs for the HSHX candidate designs. The
Table also includes a relative comparison between the materials to resist transient
thermal stresses in the HSHX mounting support frames (see Figure 11-2). The
thermal stress sensitivity parameter AT is indicative of the maximum allowable
temperature differential across the support frame assuming an average frame
temperature of 866°K (11000 F) and an initial HSA temperature of 6440 K (7000 F).
The analysis is based on elastic strain theory where
ac - CO
AT Ea
the limiting stress oc is the critical yield crippling strengths of the frame. Co is a
constant depending on temperature gradient profile, E is Young's Modulus and a is
the coefficient of expansion.
The conditions for inducing thermal stress are expected during the launch transient
phase subsequent to shutdown of pad cooling and prior to reaching operating stabili-
zation temperatures. Preliminary estimates indicate that a AT across the support
frame of between 2500 K and 3000 K (4500 F and 5500 F) is to be expected during the
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TABLE 7-6. MATERIAL DESIGN TRADE-OFF CHARACTERISTICS
Support Frame HSHX
Thermal Stress Wall Gage cm (in.)
Sensitivity** Axial Tube HSHX Weight kg (Ibs) Material Costs ($)
Material AT Max 'K (° F) Bank Plate Fin Tube Fin Tube Fin
Refractory Alloys
Ta-10W 251 (470) .051 (.020)* .142 (.056) 19 (42) 22.2 (49)
T-111 294 (530) .051 (.020)* .142 (.056) 19 (42) 22.2 (49) 8,400 9,800
Cb-129Y 344 (620) .051 (.020)* .223 (.088) 12.7 (28) 14.0 (31) 5,000 5,500
Cb-103 344 (620) .051 (.020) .274 (.108) 12.7 (28) 18.1 (40) 5,000 7,300
Cb-lZr 400 (720) .051 (.020) .274 (.108) 12.2 (27) 17.7 (39) 5,000 5,000
Noble Alloys
Pt 30 Rh 300 (540) .127 (.050) .635 (.250) 53.5 (118) 95.0 (210) 354,000 629,000
Pt26Rh8W 316 (570) .051 (.020)* .228 (.090) 24.4 (54) 27. 2 (60) 162, 000 181, 000
Pt30Rhl0W 322 (580) .051 (.020)* .205 (.081) 25.0 (55) 28.6 (63) 164,000 188,000
Superalloys
HA-188 150 (270) .101 (.040) .535 (.210) 22. 6 (50) 41. 6 (92) 650 1,200
TD-NI 172 (310) .064 (.025) .366 (.144) 13. 1 (29) 24.0 (53) 1, 300 2,400
*These dimensions established by fabrication limits rather than creep strength requirements.
**Support frame temperature - 866 K (11000 F).
launch transient; comparison of the values in the table to the predicted AT deter-
mines whether design requirements are met.
The following observations are made from Table 7-6.
1. The thermal stress capability for superalloys is less than the estimated
AT, indicating a marginal design.
2. The required gages for a plate fin HSHX, fabricated from superalloys are
large, and probably border on, reasonable limits for fabrication.
3. The material costs for the noble metal alloys are extremely high.
4. The columbium alloys result in the lowest weight system and, in general,
produce the greatest margin with regard to thermal stress.
From the above the following conclusions are reached:
1. Noble metal alloys are not a viable candidate material because of ex-
cessive cost.
2. Superalloys are not considered to be an attractive candidate because
their structural properties (high coefficient of expansion, low creep
strength) at high temperatures result in a marginal HSA design and a
coating would probably be required to prevent high evaporation loss
in vacuum.
3. The columbium alloys are preferred over tantalum alloys because of their
lower weight. Although the tantalum base alloys exhibit greater creep
strength than the columbium alloys, their higher densities and lower
ductility offset this advantage, especially since the columbium alloys
exhibit sufficient strength for the HSA design.
From the above considerations, columbium refractory alloys are recommended
for fabrication of the HSHX and other HSA components within the insulation en-
closure.
7.5.2 FABRICABILITY AND COATABILITY
Selection of a particular columbium alloy is based on the ease of fabricating and
coating. Coatability is included because of the desirability to increase the emis-
sivity of the HSHX to minimize Heat Source operational temperatures. The columbium
alloys exhibit emissivities that are less than 0. 3. Fabricability is assessed by the
ability to work and weld the material.
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Cb-129Y is difficult to weld. Cb-1Zr is readily worked and welded. It can be coated
or grit blasted to increase its emissivity. Cb-103 can also be easily worked and
welded. It can be coated a little more readily than Cb-1Zr, and can also be grit
blasted to increase the emissivity. Both Cb-lZr and Cb-103 satisfy all the require-
ments of paragraph 7. 1. 1 and remain as viable candidates. Further material charac-
terization at HSA operational temperatures for both materials, however, is required
before final selection can be made.
7.6 COMPATIBILITY OF COLUMBIUM ALLOYS
1. Reaction with Gases
Like other electropositive elements and their alloys, columbium alloys
react with gases such as oxygen, nitrogen, carbon oxides, and water
vapor.
a. Oxygen enters the metal interstitially and goes into solid solutions.
It combines with trace elements which precipitate in grain boundaries
as oxides. This results in embrittlement and hardening of the alloy
along with an associated decrease in ductile brittle transition tem-
perature (DBT).
b. Columbium and its alloys dissolve nitrogen starting at temperatures
in the range of 1323 0 K. Its solid solubility is the highest for pure
columbium and decreases as the concentration of alloying elements
such as tungsten, molybdenum, hafnium, etc., is increased. The
presence of nitrogen lowers oxidation resistance and lowers DBT
due to the formation of nitrides in grain boundaries.
c. Water vapor reacts with columbium and its alloys at temperature as
low as 13730K (2012' F). The products of reaction degrade alloy
properties by inducing intercrystalline boundary buildup of oxide
precipitates and the introduction of hydrogen in the crystal lattice,
resulting in embrittlement.
From the above considerations it is evident that the HSA, fabricated from
the recommended columbium alloys cannot be brought to operating tem-
peratures in an air environment.
2. Stability of Columbium Alloys in Contact with Graphite
The carbides of elements in columbium alloys form at slow rates, at
temperatures in the range of 14730K to 1873 K (21920 F to 29120 F) in
the presence of hydrocarbon gases and when in contact with carbon. At
22730 K (36320 F) reactions proceed at rapid rates taking only hours to
complete. As carbon diffuses into the metal in small quantities, carbide
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embrittlement results. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent columbium
alloys from contacting graphite at high temperatures. For the HSA design,
columbium will not contact the Heat Source graphite emissivity sleeve
during high temperatures operation, hence no compatibility problem with
graphite is anticipated.
3. Other Compatibility Considerations
No adverse reactions with the working fluid, helium-xenon, or as a result
of the nuclear radiation from the isotope have been identified. It will be
necessary to confirm the compatibility of refractory alloy manifolds with
the Mini-Brayton BRU and recuperator interfacing materials.
7.7 MATERIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the foregoing discussions, the material recommended for the HSHX
and other HSA high temperature components is either of the refractory columbium
alloys, Cb-103 or Cb-lZr. The HSA can be designed with adequate margins of
safety and fabricated from these materials into reliable hardware for a five-year
operational lifetime in space. Some additional long time creep property data at
HSA operating temperature must be developed to perform detail design analyses.
Mini-Brayton ground system tests at power must be conducted with the HSA either
in a vacuum chamber or in an inert gas environment to prevent oxidation of the
refractory alloy.
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SECTION 8
HEAT SOURCE HEAT EXCHANGER (HSHX)
The Heat Source Heat Exchanger is the component which transfers the thermal energy
from the Heat Source to the gas stream. In normal operation, it operates at a tem-
perature intermediate between the Heat Source surface and the working fluid. This
section deals with the concepts which were initially screened, the performance of the
several concepts which survived initial screening, the stress analysis which affected
the selection process, and the final trade off and assessment process.
8.1 CONCEPTS
During the study, five potential HSHX concepts were identified as shown in Figure 8-1.
Concept A consists of a tube spirally wrapped around the Heat Source. It is a simple
concept with a minimum of joints and no flow distribution problems. However, the
pressure drop in a single tube is excessive.
Concept B consists of axial headers which are connected with semi-circular tubes. It
proved to have both acceptable heat transfer and pressure drop with 0. 635 cm (0. 25in)
OD tubes, but not with 1. 27 cm (0. 5 inch) OD tubes. In addition to being sensitive to
tube sizing, it appeared that shaped headers would be required to prevent flow mal-
distribution, and that many joints would be necessary.
Concept C consists of axial tubes fastened to annular headers. Although a large num-
ber of joints are required, both heat transfer and pressure drop were entirely accept-
able. Flow distribution would be easier to control than Concept B since the tubes were
longer and the headers would be in an area of the HSA where more room was available.
Concept D consists of two large concentric cyclinders with corrugated sheet metal
between them. Both heat transfer and pressure drop were acceptable, however,
questions of the stress developed in the large diameter tubes, and fabrication of the
entire unit required resolution. A variation of Concept D involves forming fins by
machining axial grooves in the inner cyclinder and bonding the outer cyclinder to the
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Figure 8-1. Heat Source Heat Exchanger Concepts
tips of the fins by diffusion welding. Its heat transfer and pressure drop character-
istics are similar to D. This concept seemed to eliminate the questionable character-
istics of corrugated plate fin concept.
The last concept, E, was similar to Concept D, except that alternate channels were to
be used for the auxiliary cooling system. It appeared that the manifolds (headers)
would be very complex.
Selection of viable HSHX designs are based on acceptable pressure drop, heat transfer
characteristics, stress response and fabricability. An initial screening of the concepts-
summarized in Figure 8-2 - eliminated all but the axial tube bank (Concept C) and
plate fin HSHX's (Concept D). The other concepts, excluded from further considera-
tions, exhibit either unacceptable pressure drop characteristics or complex manifold-
ing and ducting.
8.2 THERMAL/HYDRAULIC PERFORMANCE
Figures 8-3 and 8-4 show the thermal/hydraulic performance of the tube and plate fin
concepts selected as a result of the initial screening process. Figure 8-3 is for the
axial tube configuration in which the significant variables are for the low pressure
system case (which is the limiting one). It shows the core pressure drop, number of
tubes, and the maximum Heat Source temperature which is required to remove 2400
watts from the heat source across a vacuum gap. Two cases are shown, one for a
solid wall of tubes (the solid lines) and another for tubes spaced one diameter apart
(the dashed lines). The A P limit shown is a sufficiently large fraction of the total AP
limit (0. 149N/cm 2 or 0. 216 psi) so that flow distribution can be controlled without
either orifices or shaped headers. The temperatures are given for a high HSHX
emissivity coating ( E = 0. 8) which might require a coating development program to
obtain. The baseline design however, assumes an emissivity of E = 0. 4 which is con-
sidered within the present state of the art and which would result in temperatures
approximately 22 ° K (40' F) above those shown on the figures.
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Figure 8-2. HSHX Trade-Offs
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Figure 8-4 shows similar details for the fin type heat exchanger. The variables here
are fin spacing, fins per inch and fin thickness, typically 0. 025 cm for the corrugated
fin and 0. 051 cm or greater for the machined fin concept. This figure and Figure 8-2
agree quite well, as can be seen by converting a machined fin case (5 fins/inch,
0. 051 cm thick, 0. 406 cm wide annulus) to an equivalent tubular design. There are
about 125 channels in this design and they are touching. They are thermally similar to
the case of 125, 0. 508 cm OD tubes. The pressure drop is lower for the finned design,
however, due to the total area difference as well as the channel shapes.
Manifolding between parallel units (one to three units) and within the HSA was also con-
sidered. Figure 8-5 shows the arrangement considered for the tube-header design,
Concept C. Manifolding would be similar for the plate fin designs. Table 8-1 shows
the pressure drops associated with the low pressure (1 unit) and high pressure (3 units)
system for a 90 tube HSHX design. Note that the one unit, low pressure system is
limiting, and that a slightly larger manifold transition pipes would be required for this
particular design to reduce the total A P slightly.
15.2 cm) . 5 IN ID (3.8 cm)
HSHX HEADER
3 INCH ID MANIFOLD
A HSHX TUBES (7.6 cm)
RECUPERATOR
OUTLET
1.5 INCH (3.8 cm) HSHX HEADERS TURBINE
I WET
SECTION A-A
Figure 8-5. Headers and Manifolding Concepts
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TABLE 8-1. PRESSURE DROP ANALYSIS
CONCEPT C - AXIAL TUBES
3 HSA's 1 HSA
Pressure Drop Pressure Drop
Item Size (high pressure) (low pressure)
N/cm2  psi N/cm 2  psi
HSHX Tubes 90 Tubes; 0. 0635 CM ID (1/4 in. ) 0. 021 0. 031 0. 063 0. 091
Bend Into HSHX Header (2) 90 Degree Bend 0. 015 0.022 0. 046 0. 066
Expansion Into HSHX Header 
- 0. 006 0. 008 0. 016 0. 024
Header (including exit) 3. 8 CM ID (1. 5 in. ) 0. 002 0.003 0. 006 0. 009
Header-Manifold Transition Pipe 3. 8 CM ID x 15. 3 CM Long 0.019 0.028 0. 021 0.031(includes 90* bend) (1. 5 in. ID x 6 in. long)
Inlet and Outlet (For 3 Units) 7. 6 CM ID x 61 CM Long (each) 0. 002 0.003 -
Manifold Piping (3 in. ID x 2 ft. long)
Total AP 0.065 0.095 0. 152 0.221
Allowable A P 0. 157 0. 228 0. 149 0. 216
8.3 STRESS ANALYSIS
The preliminary stress analysis was directed at general sizing of tubes and plates for
the various designs. Three areas were studied in some detail.
The tubes in the axial tube designs are limited by the creep stress due to the high-
pressure operating requirement. For the small diameter tubes (0. 635 cm to 1. 27 cm
or 0. 25 to 0. 5 inch) required thickness ranged from 0. 015 cm (0. 006 in) with tantalum
based refractories to. 015 cm (. 02 inch) with columbium alloys in the 0. 635 cm
(0. 25 inch) tube size, which appeared unlikely to cause fabrication problems.
The headers in the axial tube design, where the small tubes enter a flat ring, presented
a different problem. Calculations showed that thickness ranging between 0. 36 cm
(0. 14 in) for tantalum alloys to 0. 79 cm (0. 31 inch) with columbium alloys, would be
required. As later fabrication studies showed, the interface between the small gauge
tube and these thick sections posed a serious, but not unsurmountable problem.
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The concentric cylinders forming the flow channels in the plate-fin concepts were
also creep limited. Several assumptions led to this conclusion. With the corrugated
plate-fin, the bonding between the thin fin material and the concentric cylinders would
have to be excellent to provide any support, and it appeared that if the fins restrained
the cylinders, the fins could be deformed or broken by the creep forces. If the fins
were not well bonded to the outer cylinder (not required by heat transfer considera-
tions) they would not restrain its deformation. Therefore, the cylinders were analyzed
as unsupported with respect to radial creep. For flow gap of up to 1. 27 cm (0. 5 inch),
wall thicknesses ranged from 0. 114 cm (0. 045 in) for tantalum alloys to 0. 254 cm
(0. 10 in) for columbium alloys. No fabrication problems are anticipated for these
gauges.
8.4 TRADEOFFS
The tube design results in the lightest weight HSHX (see Section 11) but requires many
more parts and welded or brazed joints, than the plate fin. As discussed in Section 12,
fabrication of a refractory corrugated plate fin HSHX is difficult because of long blind
braze joints at the corrugation/cylinder wall interface. The machined plate fin HSHX
does not exhibit this problem since it can be assembled with diffusion bonds between
the fin and the outer cylinder wall to form a monolithic structure. From this point of
view it appears to be the best design. Nonetheless, all three HSHX concepts (tube,
corrugated plate fin and machined plate fin) are considered acceptable.
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SECTION 9
AUXILIARY COOLING SUBSYSTEM
The Auxiliary Cooling System is an active system designed to cool the heat source
when the Brayton Rotating Unit is not operating. It provides the ability to load the
HS into the HSA without starting the unit until orbit is achieved.
9.1 REQUIREMENTS
The ACS must maintain exposed surfaces of the HSA to temperatures not exceeding
466. 50K (3800 F) and must limit the graphite surface of the Heat Source to tempera-
ture below 5000 K (4400 F) in the presence of an oxidizing environment.
9.2 CONCEPTS
Figure 9-1 shows seven concepts considered for active auxiliary cooling of the HSA.
An inherent requirement is that the ACS design be capable of being integrated with
the HSHX.
Concept A is a simple helical tube wrapped around the outside of the HSHX. Because.
of the thermal resistance represented by the HSHX, the coolant flow can not maintain
the Heat Source at its requisite temperature of 6720 K (7500 F) on the pad. If the
helical tube is located inboard of the HSHX it impedes heat transfer from the Heat
Source to the HSHX during Mini-Brayton power operation. Consequently this concept
was eliminated as a candidate.
Concept B consists of circumferential tube segments with axial headers. It would be
difficult to integrate this design with the HSHX axial tube and plate fin configurations
and in addition it has the same heat transfer problem described above for concept A.
This concept therefore, was also eliminated as a candidate.
Concept C provides cooling flow outside the thermal insulation. Although it can main-
tain exposed surfaces below 466. 50 K (3800F) it will not satisfy the second requirement
of maintaining the Heat Source surface temperature below -500 K (4400 F). This con-
cept was eliminated as a candidate.
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Figure 9-1. Auxiliary Cooling Subsystem Concepts
Concepts D and E are an axial tube bank and plate fin configuration respectively,
similar to the HSHX concepts discussed in the previous section. A design in which
either of these Auxiliary Cooling Heat Exchangers is entirely inboard or outboard
of the HSHX is unacceptable from a heat transfer point of view as discussed for
concept A. The only configuration which would meet design requirements are axial
tubes that alternates with an axial HSHX tubes. Although this alternating tube con-
figuration is a feasible concept it has not been selected as the prime candidate for
the reasons discussed in the next paragraph where the selected concept is described.
Concept F which provides alternate cooling and HSHX channels in a plate fin con-
figuration, results in complex manifolding and was consequently eliminated.
Concept G is quite different from the others which confine the cooling flow to passages
in the same manner as the HSHX. In this concept the cooling flow is ducted directly
over the Heat Source in the annulus formed by the outer surface of the Heat Source
and the HSHX inboard wall. Since the Heat Source is cooled directly by convection
it is apparent that this is the most thermally efficient auxiliary cooling system. It
is also the lightest in weight since it utilizes an existing annulus and requires the
least amount of additional hardware. It consequently is the selected approach.
Typical auxiliary cooling flow requirements for three gases at 2940K (700 F) which
are potential coolants, are given in Table 9-1.
TABLE 9-1. AUXILIARY COOLING REQUIREMENTS
Annulus Gap
0. 318 cm 0. 635 cm
(0. 125 in) (0. 25 in)
Maximum HS Temperature oK (0 F) 6720 (7500) 6720 (7500) 4500 (3500)
Helium Flow Rate - Kgm/hr (lb/hr) 4.9 (10.8) - 32 (70)
Nitrogen Flow Rate - Kgm/hr (lb/hr) 57. 2 (126) 81.6 (180) 236 (520)
Argon Flow Rate - Kgm/hr (lb/hr) - - 526 (1160)
9-3
9.3 OPERATIONAL OPTIONS
A number of options are possible in operating the ACS. The ACS can be used with an
inert gas of high purity to provide a cover gas over the Heat Source should it be de-
sirable to operate the Mini-Brayton system at power on the launch pad. Additionally,
if it is at all necessary to provide cooling within the shuttle payload bay either during
ascent, during parking orbit periods or during re-entry (if the complete HSA or
Mini-Brayton system is retrieved), a cooling gas supply can be provided as ancillary
equipment in the shuttle and connected to the ACS inlet port. For such operation,
the coolant would either vent to the payload bay or overboard to space using appro-
priate ducting. Similarly upon landing, either a ground cooling gas supply can be
provided for the ACS (as it is on the launch pad), or coolant can be carried along
in the shuttle in the event of a possibility of landing at a remote site. The latter
contingency should probably be planned for as a safety precaution.
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SECTION 10
EMERGENCY COOLING
The Emergency Cooling Subsystem provides passive cooling of the Heat Source in the
event of any operational failure of the Mini-Brayton Power Conversion system or HSA,
which produces an overtemperature of the Heat Source after lift off.
10.1 REQUIREMENTS
The ECS is designed to the following requirements
1. It must operate only once.
2. It must be capable of operating with high reliability over the 5 year
operational life time.
3. It should not rely on any external power for generation of an electrical
signal.
4. It must limit the external surface (emissivity sleeve) of the Heat Source
to steady state temperatures not exceeding 13730K (2012. F).
5. It must limit peak transient temperatures on the PICS fuel/Iridium interface
to less than 23720 K (38100 F) for a maximum of five (5) minutes. The
corresponding Heat Source surface temperature is estimated to be 19220 K
(30000 F).
10.2 CONCEPTS
The Emergency Cooling Subsystem consists of two insulated end doors, activated by
an Emergency Cooling Device which responds to overtemperature of the Heat Source.
The forward door also serves as the Heat Source loading door. The steady state
temperature distribution along the Heat Source that results with both doors open in
space is given in Figure 10-1. A heat sink temperature of 3390 K (1500 F) was assumed.
The maximum HS surface temperature of 11670 K (16400 F) occurs at the mid point
along the Heat Source. The temperature at the radiating ends of the Heat Source is
8530K (10760 F). These temperatures are well below the operating temperature of the
Heat Source in the Mini-Brayton System. During the time to reach steady state
conditions the transient temperatures will also be lower than operational temperatures.
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Figure 10-1. Heat Source Surface Temperature with Emergency Cooling Doors Open.
With only one end door open a large temperature gradient and an excessively high tem-
perature at the end of the Heat Source opposite the open door, occur. Although the
radiating surface would be 10320 K (13980 F), the heat Source temperature at the
opposite end would exceed 31000 K (51200 F) which is beyond safe levels. This imposes
the requirement that for emergency cooling, both doors must open.
The device that responds to a Heat Source overtemperature and opens the doors is the
Emergency Cooling Device. Four types of temperature response mechanisms con-
sidered are as follows:
1. Gas or liquid expansion
2. Expansion of a mechanical link
3. Melting of a mechanical link (fusible link)
4. Pyrotechnic devices (pyrotechnics which activate by an electrical impulse
would violate requirement 3 of paragraph 10. 1).
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A fifth concept is discussed which violates requirement 3 of paragraph, 10. 1, since
it relies on generation of an electrical signal. It is presented because it represents
a simple and reliable device which may justify re-examination and perhaps relaxation
of that design requirement.
The concepts are depicted in Figure 10-2. All of the ECD's disengage a spring loaded
release and latch mechanism on each of the two end doors; a spring loaded door hinge
diametrically opposite the latch release, forces each door to a full open position.
The door hinge would be provided with a manual release (not shown on the figure) for
opening the doors during assembly Heat Source loading and to provide a contingency
for removing the Heat Source from the shuttle in the event of an emergency on the pad.
The springs are all located in a low temperature region outside the HSA insulation
blanket, to avoid potential high temperature creep problems. No attempt has been made
to optimize or even design the latch and hinge. They are shown as a simple working
concepts to illustrate the functional operation of the ECD. It is possible for example
to combine the latch release mechanism and the door hinge into one assembly so that
in all modes the doors rotate about one axis.
Configuration "A" is an example of a liquid/gas expansion device. A container of either
liquid or gas responds to the temperature rise of the heat source with a rise in pres-
sure. At a pressure corresponding to the abnormal temperature, a prestressed mem-
brane (rupture disk) releases the stored energy driving a piston connected to the latch
release mechanism, allowing the doors to open.
Configuration "B" is an example of a thermal expansion device. A metal strap with a
predicatable rate of expansion grows in length as the heat source temperature rises
above normal. When the heat source reaches a critical temperature, the metal strap
has grown to a length that initiates the release of the spring loaded rod in the latch
release.
In Configuration "C" a retaining link in the latch release assembly is melted, releasing
a spring loaded pin which in turn activates the latch release mechanism. Melting of
the retaining link occurs as a result of direct conduction along a thermal conductive
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Figure 10-2. Emergency Cooling Device Concepts
strap or by ignition of a pyrotechnic braid which in turn melts the retaining link. This
ECD can be designed so that the melting retaining link is at the Heat Source Interface,
thus not depending on a conductive path.
Configuration "D" employs an electrical signal which initiates the release mechanism.
In this concept a thermocouple senses the temperature of the heat source and triggers
an electrical impulse to a pyro-assembly restraining the release mechanism. A
solenoid can be substituted for the pyro-assembly. A variation of this concept is one
that responds to a Mini-Brayton power system failure. A sudden decrease in power is
sensed, tripping a relay which initiates the pyro. A small battery on constant trickle
charge, floating off the electrical power line, provides the current to fire the pyro.
This concept would require an interlock to prevent activation of the device prior to,
and during start up of the Mini-Brayton system in orbit.
In each of the above concepts, the ECD activates both doors and is located at the aft
end of the HSA, that is, at the end opposite the loading door. The ECD is thermally
coupled to the end of the Heat Source either by radiation exchange or by a short con-
ductive strap, so that it responds quickly to any increase in Heat Source temperature.
Analyses indicates that the ECD must be located in a region of the HSA that responds
quickly to Heat Source temperature. It was found for example that if the ECD is
coupled to the structural support container, the temperature response would be entirely
too slow; the Heat Source will in this case rise to untolerable levels before the ECD is
activated.
10.3 TRADEOFFS
Advantages and disadvantages of each of the concepts are summarized in Table 10-1.
On the basis of this preliminary study it would appear that the liquid or gas expansion
device may be one of the most attractive concepts since its operation is simple and
predictable and the possibility of a leak in the pressure vessel can be minimized by
over design. The electrical signal device is probably the simplest and can be designed
to assure high reliability. It is recommended that this device be considered. Clearly,
however, detailed transient analyses are required before any final ECD concept can be
selected. Redundancies for the selected ECD will have to be built into the design to
assure very high reliability for operation over the five year life time.
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TABLE 10-1. ECD TRADE OFFS
Concept Advantages Disadvantages
Liquid or Gas Expansion Predictable response (increase in Pressure vessel at high temper-
pressure) as a function of tempera- ature for 5 years must not
ture develop leaks
Melting Fusible Link Simple mechanical device based on Predictability uncertain.
an irreversible physical phenomenon Difficult to select precise
temperature for ECD operation
since device may release door
prior to actual melting as it
loses strength and creeps with
increasing temperature
Pyrotechnic Predictable response. Pyro can be Stability of pyro characteristics
selected to fire at desired temp. after 5 years at high tempera-
ture uncertain; presence of pyro
in isotope system may present
potential hazard.
Expansion of Mechanical Predictable response based on ex- Creep at high temperature after
Link pansion characteristics of metal long time periods may activate
doors prematurely
Electrical Signal Precise, predictable response Requires power for generation
based on temperature sensor of electrical signal.
SECTION 11
HEAT SOURCE ASSEMBLY DESIGN
HSA designs were developed for each of the candidate HSHX designs discussed in
Section 8. These are:
1. Corrugated plate fin
2. Machined plate fin
3. Axial tube bank
In the following discussions the HSA designs will be referred to by the above terminology
to distinguish them from each other.
11. 1 PLATE FIN HSA CONCEPTS
11. 1. 1 CONFIGURATIONS
Details of the two plate fin Heat Source heat exchanger designs are shown in Figure 11-1.
Except where noted structural sizing is based on 1% creep stress limits in the longitudinal
directions and 2% in the radial direction. The HSHX wall gauges are sized for 80 N/cm 2
(115 psi) which is the highest Mini-Brayton system pressure. In sizing the HSHX walls
no credit is taken for the support constraint provided by bonded fins or corrugations to
the outer HSHX cylindrical wall. The HSHX consists of flow channels running axially
between two concentric cylindrical walls 0. 254 cm (0. 10 inches) thick. The differences
between the two plate fin HSA's is shown in section AA of the figure. The Machined Plate
Fin consists of 0. 051 cm (0.02 inch) fins to the inch (--2 fins/cm) and the annulus gap is
0.41 (0. 16 inches). The fin dimension and number of fins per unit length are governed
by fabrication considerations. The annulus gap size is determined by pressure drop
requirements.
The second plate fin concept, the Corrugated Plate Fin consists of 0. 0254 cm (0. 01 inch)
thick corrugations forming the fins. In this concept there are 10 fins to the inch (,5 fins/
cm) and the gap size between inner and outer annulus walls is 0. 66 cm (0. 26 inches). The
corrugations are either welded or brazed to the HSHX walls. Once again the corrugation
sizing is governed by fabrication constraints and the gap size by flow considerations.
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The heat exchanger(s) terminate in inlet and outlet toroidal headers with a circular
cross section of 1. 905 cm (0. 75 inch) radius. The headers are welded to the HSHX
annulus walls. The headers transition to inlet and outlet header ports which manifold
the flow to and from the Heat Source Assembly.
Auxiliary cooling inlet and outlet ports are concentric with the HSHX ports to minimize
the penetration area through the insulation blanket. The auxiliary coolant flows over
the Heat Source in a 0. 635 cm (0. 25 inch) annulus formed by the Heat Source and the
inner wall of the HSHX.
The complete HSA is shown in detail on the drawing of Figure 11-2. The Heat Source
and the HSHX are supported off a 0. 254 cm (0. 1 inch) cylindrical support container
which is adjacent to and inboard of the insulation blanket. HSA support fittings are
attached to the container to interface with shuttle support hardware. The HSHX is
supported off the container by HSHX support frames at both ends. Four HSHX tubular
support struts provide torsional stiffness and take out longitudinal launch loads on the
HSHX. The frame attachments are designed so that at one end the fitting is fixed to
react both longitudinal and transverse loads while the opposite frame takes out only
transverse loads. This allows longitudinal growth with minimal induced thermal
stresses as the components heat up to operational temperatures.
The Heat Source is supported off the support container by forward and aft Heat Source
Supports and End Enclosures ("Spider's"). These are shown in detail in Figure 11-3.
The Heat Source Support and End Enclosures are similar in design to the MHW-RTG
Heat Source Support and End Enclosures. The Heat Source vent tube passes through
the Heat Source Support and angles laterally over the HSHX header. The End Enclosures
consist of six spider like radial "I" beams with interconnecting webs. The six mounting
feet engage the mounting brackets attached to the support container. Engagement is
accomplished by rotating the End Enclosure. The forward End Enclosure is preloaded
by rotating a bushing that threads onto the Heat Source Support.
Three quarter turn retaining screws are provided as a redundant component.to release
the pre-load in event of freeze up of the bushing when removing the Heat Source in orbit.
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Figure 11-1. Machined and Corrugated Plate Fin Heat Exchangers
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Figure 11-3. Heat Source Support
The aft End Enclosure is identical to the Forward End Enclosure except for the absence
of the bushing.
Hinged insulation doors on both ends of the HSA provide emergency cooling when in the
open position. The forward end door also serves as the Heat Source loading door. The
entire assembly is 66.95 cm (26. 36 inches) long with a diameter of 35. 84 cm (14.12
inches).
11. 1. 2 PERFORMANCE AND WEIGHT
11. 1. 2. 1 Pressure Drop
The HSHX flow channels for both the machined plate fin and corrugated plate fin HSHX's
are sized so that the pressure drop in the HSHX core for a single HSA Mini-Brayton
system is 0. 069 N/cm2 (0. 1 psi). The low power Mini-Brayton system (1 HSA) is the
one that results in the largest pressure drop through the HSHX core and thus becomes
the limiting case for pressure drop design. As discussed in Section 8, a core pressure
drop of 0. 069 N/cm2 (0. 1 psi) was chosen so that a large fraction of the total pressure
drop in the HSA occurs in the Heat Exchanger to assure good flow distributions. The
pressure drop contribution due to flow transition from and into the inlet and headers,
flow within the headers, and transition from and to the six inch long inlet and outlet
ports, is estimated to be 0. 082 N/cm2 (0. 12 psi). The total pressure drop for the
system is approximately 0. 151 N/cm2 (0. 22 psi) which meets the system requirements.
For the high power Mini-Brayton system utilizing 3 HSA's in parallel, including 60 cm
(2 feet) of 7. 6 cm (3 inch) ID manifolding piping between the HSA's, the pressure drop
is estimated to be less than 0. 069 N/cm (0. 1 psi). This is well below the maximum
permissible AP of 0. 157 N/cm 2 (0. 228 psi) for the three HSA systems.
11.1.2.2 Thermal Performance
The temperature distribution along with HSHX wall and Heat Source is given in Figure
11-4.for the machined plate fin design. Temperatures for emissivities of e= 0.4 and
0.8 on the HSHX wall facing the Heat Source, are given. An emissivity of e = 0.4 cor-
responds to grit blasting the HSHX surface; to obtain an emissivity of e = 0. 8 which
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Figure 11-4. Axial Temperature Distribution
would reduce Heat Source temperatures by approximately 300 K (540 F), would require
a coating. The maximum Heat Source surface temperature for the machined plate fin
designed with e = 0. 4 is -~ 12690 K (18250 F). This is over 1000K (1800F) lower
than the specified operating temperature of the Heat Source in the MHW RTG. The temp-
perature distribution for the corrugated plate fin design is similar to the one shown except
that all HSHX and heat source temperatures are approximately 390 K (700 F) lower than
those shown for the machined plate fin. The lower heat source temperatures result
primarily because of the greater heat transfer area provided by the additional number
of fins in this design.
11.1.2.3 Weight
An estimate of the weight breakdown for the designs (which are not optimized for mini-
mum weight) are as follows:
Machine Plate Corrugated Plate
Fin Fin
Kg lb Kg lb
Heat Source 21.8 48 21.8 48
Support Container (Cb-103) 16. 8 37 16. 8 37
Heat Source Support Structure
(Cb-103) 5.5 12 5.5 12
HSHX Support Structure (Cb-103) 1. 8 4 1.8 4
Insulation Blanket (Moly Foil) 9.1 20 9.1 20
HSHX Headers (Cb-103) 18.6 41 19.5 43
Misc (Cb-103) 4.1 9 4.1 9
HSA Total - 77. 7 171 78.6 173
The use of Cb-lZr does not alter the weight estimate.
11.2 TUBULAR HSA CONCEPT
11.2.1 CONFIGURATION
The axial tube bank Heat Source Heat Exchanger is shown in Figure 11-5. It consists
of thirty-five equally spaced 0. 95 cm (3/8 in) OD diameter tubes brazed to an inner
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Figure 11-5. Axial Tube Bank Heat
Exchanger
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liner which along with the Heat Source Surface forms the 0. 38 cm (0. 15 inch) annular
gap for auxiliary cooling flow. The tube walls are 0. 076 cm (0. 03 inch) thick and are
sized for a pressure level of 79 N/cm 2 (115 psi) and the same creep criteria used for
the plate fin designs. The tubes terminate in a "D" shaped toroidal header which is
formed by 0. 76 cm (0. 3 inch) thick plate welded to a 1. 905 cm (0. 75 inch) radius
toroidal section. The bend in the tubes near the headers is made to accommodate a
MHW type Heat Source loading tool. The HSA Assembly is shown on the drawing of
Figure 11-6. The HSHX and HSA support structure and other details of the assembly
are essentially identical to the plate fin HSA which is described in paragraph 11. 1.
The overall length of the HSA is 66. 95 cm (26. 36 in) and the diameter is 35. 84 cm
(14. 12 in).
11. 2.2 PERFORMANCE AND WEIGHT
11. 2. 2. 1 Pressure Drop
The tubular flow area was sized to result in a pressure drop of 0. 069 N/cm2 (0. 1 psi)
within the HSHX core for the single HSA Mini-Brayton system. The pressure drop
contribution of the rest of the HSA system is essentially the same as that given in
11. 1. 2. 1 for the plate fin designs, thus resulting in a total pressure drop of 0. 151
N/cm 2 (0. 22 psi).
The total pressure drop for a three HSA Mini-Brayton system is approximately 0. 069
N/cm 2 (0. 1 psi). As with the plate fin designs, pressure drop design limitations are
satisfied.
11.2.2.2 Thermal Performance
The thermal response of the HSA is similar to that for the machined plate fin given
in Figure 11-4 except that both the tube wall and the Heat Source run approximately
500K (900 F) higher. The maximum heat source surface temperature for this design
with the HSHX e = 0. 4 is 13190 K (19150 F), approximately 56 0 K (100 0 F) below the MHW
specified temperature. The tubular heat exchanger clearly is not as efficient a heat
exchanger as the plate fin.
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11.2.2.3 Weight
The weight breakdown for the axial tube design (which is not optimized for minimum
weight) is as follows:
Kg Lb
Heat Source 21.8 48
Support Container (Cb-103) 16.8 37
Heat Source Support Structure (Cb-103) 5. 5 12
HSHX Support Structure (Cb-103) 1.8 4
Insulation Blanket (Moly Foil) 9.1 20
HSHX and Header (Cb-103) 12.7 28
Misc. (Cb-103) 4. 1 9
71.8 158
11. 3 HSA TRADEOFF
Final selection of an HSA design is based on the following criteria:
1. Reliability of the assembly
2. Minimum Heat Source Temperature
3. Flow Control
4. Minimum Weight
5. Minimum Cost
Reliability is related to the fabrication process and the number of joints in the Heat
Exchanger/Header Assembly. Brazing is less attractive than welding because of the
introduction of additional alloys which potentially can contaminate welds and create
material compatability problems. Minimum Heat Source temperature is desirable to
provide added safety design margin for the isotope heat source. Flow control is af-
fected primarily by the dimensional control and stability of the flow channels and is
significant because it can influence performance of the system. The fixed cost of the
plutonium fueled heat source is the dominant factor in overall HSA cost; the perturba-
tions in total HSA cost due to the different HSHX design is small.
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A qualitative comparison of the three HSA designs is summarized in Table 11-1.
Relative ratings are indicated by numerals 1 to 3, one being the best rating. Overall,
it appears that the machined plate fin is the most attractive design. It offers the
simplest and most reliable design from a fabrication point of view; has excellent flow
control characteristics; and results in a moderately low Heat Source operational tem-
perature. It may be possible to reduce the Heat Source operational temperature further
by incorporating a greater number of machined fins to increase the heat transfer rates
to the working fluid.
TABLE 11-1. HSA TRADE OFF COMPARISONS
HSA
Design
Criterion Machined Plate Fin Corrugated Plate Fin Axial Tube Bank Comments
Reliability Can be welded design Brazing required Brazing rq'd;
largest number
(1) (2) of joints
(3)
Heat Source Temperature 12690 K (18250 F) 12300 K (17550 F) 13190 K (19150 F)
(for HSHX e = 0. 4) (2) (1) (3)
Flow Control Excellent control and Corrugations offer Excellent control
stability of flow relatively poor and stability of
channel dimensions dimensional control flow channel
(1) and 5-year lifetime dimensions
stability of flow (1)
channels (3)
Weight 77. 7 Kg (171 Ib) 78.6 Kg (173 Ib) 71. 8 Kg (158 lb) The -1 Kg differ-
ence between the(2) (2) (1) two plate fin de-
signs is within
the uncertainty of
the preliminary
weight calcula-
tions
Cost No significant cost difference for materials and fabrication
(1) (1) (1)
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SECTION 12
ASSEMBLY AND FABRICATION
This section contains a discussion of manufacturing and assembly consideration for
the three candidate HSHX designs. The problem areas, required manufacturing
steps, development requirements and costs estimates are presented. Figure 12-1
shows the three final concepts. For the tubular design the fabrication options are
all in the techniques of attaching the small axial tubes to the toroidal headers. The
options for the plate-fin designs are in the method of attaching the fins to the inner
and outer cylinders.
Table 12-1 summarizes the cost estimate for fabrication of each design. These
are rough costs intended only for comparison between concepts and not actual esti-
mates of a program to design, build, and qualify the design. The estimated fabri-
cation costs are similar for the designs and fabrication options are such a small
part of a reasonable development program that it is concluded that the differences
are insignificant.
Axial Tube Bank
3/8" OD
(0.955 cm) , .
HS Liner
Plate Fin
(Corrugated Fins) (Machined Fin)
Inner Cylinder 0.1 flow
- (0.41 cm)
Outer Cylinder \ HS Outer
Cylinder
-0.25" flow
gap (0.64 cm)
* Fabrication Options 
* Fabrication Options
* Braze Fins to Inner Cylinder Only Difussion Bond Outer Cylinder to Fins
* Braze Fins to Inner & Outer Cylinders Brazing Outer Cylinder to Fins
* No Bonding of Outer Cylinder to Fins
Figure 12-1. HSHX Concepts
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TABLE 12-1. HSHX RELATIVE MANUFACTURING COSTS
(Cb-103)
Costs
Raw
Fixture Material** Total
& Fab Wt Wt Cost Remarks and High Cost Items
Design Labor* Materials Kg (lb) $ $
Plate Fin
Machined Fin
Diffusion
Bond 11,500 1200 18.6 41 6150 18,850 Machining and added cost for ex-
pendable fixturing, pressure bonding,
and leaching out molybdenum
No Bond 9,200 1100 18.6 41 6150 16,450 Machining cost
Braze Bond 10,600 1650 18.6 41 6150 18,400 As above plus braze cost
Corrogated Plate
Fin
Inner Braze 10,600 4850 19.6 43 6450 21,000 High tooling costs, high fixturing
costs, and braze costs
Inner/Outer
Braze 11,100 4950 19.6 43 6450 22,500 Same as above plus one more braze
area
Axial Tube Bank 9,100 4450 12.8 28 4200 17,750 High braze fixture cost (reuseable)
*through overhead
**wt x 3 x $50/lb
12.1 PLATE-FIN HSHX's
Tables 12-2 and 12-3 show the component fabrication and assembly sequence for the
diffusion bonded plate-fin design. The machining of the fins is a critical area. The
height-to-thickness ratio shown in Figure 11-1 is 8, determined by the fabrication
process. If this ratio is much larger, fin breakage becomes a problem. No other
area of component fabrication appears unusually difficult.
The assembly sequence involves using molybdenum strips and rings to prevent dis-
tortion when the assembly is hot-gas pressure bonded. Moly appears an excellent
material for this purpose, since its expansion coefficient is very close to that of the
columbium alloys selected (Cb-lZr, Cb-103), and leachants exist which can remove
the moly without attacking the structure. The leaching process is slow but sure, and
the result is a monolithic, bonded structure with no braze metal required. The re-
mainder of the assembly procedure is reasonably straightforward.
The variations in fabrication procedure for the machined plate fin design are shown
in Table 12-4. Except for the uncertain braze placement, these variations are
straightforward. The unbonded outer cylinder option, however, is not as attractive
from a long-time performance (flow stability) standpoint.
Table 12-5 shows the fabrication steps required for two versions of the corrugated
plate-fin concept. Braze placement and braze quality are potential problems because
of the difficulty of applying a full length axial continuous braze and the difficulty of
inspecting and repairing the braze if necessary.
The diffusion-bonded machined-fin design concept appears to be an excellent choice
from a fabrication standpoint.
12.2 TUBULAR HSHX
The fabrication and assembly of the axial tube bank HSHX, is described in Tables
12-6 and 12-7. The fabrication of the parts is straightforward. However, the
attachment of the tubes to the toroidal headers is a critical area. Figure 12-2 shows
four joint designs with the pros and cons of each. Joint number two (welded brazed
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TABLE 12-2. COMPONENT FABRICATION FOR MACHINED
PLATE FIN DESIGN
* Inner Cylinder - Roll form cylinder. Seal weld (GTA or EB). Heat
treat/anneal (if required by material). Machine Fins.
* Outer Cylinder - Identical to inner cylinder without fins.
* Header Sections - Die form and machine weld joints with self-fix-
turing configuration. Drill small hole at inlet tube locations.
* Inlet/Outlet tubes - Stub with maximum length (approximately 1. 5")
suitable for welding internally from open end. Machined for self-
fixturing weld joint.
TABLE 12-3. ASSEMBLY SEQUENCE FOR MACHINED PLATE FIN DESIGN
Diffusion Bond Outer Cylinder to Machined Fins
Fixturing:
Machine moly strips to fit between fins and at ends. Machine
expendable covers for sealing areas between inner and outer
cylinders. One cover to have small hole for leak checking and
evacuation.
Assemble strips between fins on inner cylinder.
Shrink fit inner cylinder to outer cylinder.
Assembly expendable covers; seal weld to inner and outer cylinders.
Helium leak check, evacuate in EB weld chamber, and seal vent hole.
Hot gas pressure bond in autoclave.
Inspect for bond quality.
Remove expendable end covers and leach out moly strips.
Machine weld preps - inner and outer cylinders (consumable in welds).
Weld header sections to inner and outer cylinders.
Weld inlet/outlet tubes to header.
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TABLE 12-4. ALTERNATE FABRICATION PROCESS AND ASSEMBLY
SEQUENCE FOR MACHINED PLATE FIN DESIGN
* No Bonding of Outer Cylinder to Machined Fins
Identical to diffusion bonded design except omit steps a, b, d, e, f,
g, h (diffusion bond steps) of Table 12-3. Reverse steps c and i.
(Machine weld preps before shrink fit of inner and outer cylinders).
* Braze Outer Cylinder to Machined Fins*
Identical to non-bonded design except:
After step c of Table 12-3 (fitting cylinders together) -
1 apply braze alloy
2 braze in furnace as for Tube-Header design (as in 5th step
Table 12-7)
*Full length continuous braze difficult to inspect or repair
TABLE 12-5. FABRICATION PROCESS FOR CORRUGATED PLATE FIN DESIGN
* Braze corrugated Fins to Inner Cylinder Only*
Similar to non-bonded machined fin design except:
1 No fins on inner cylinder
2 Must form corrugated fins
3 Tack weld fins to inner cylinder to locate accurately
4 Furnace braze after applying braze alloy
5 Shrink fit to outer cylinder and continue sequence
* Braze Fins to Inner and Outer Cylinders*
Similar to above except assemble tack-welded inner tube
and fins to outer cylinder before brazing operations.
*Full length continuous braze difficult to inspect or repair
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TABLE 12-6. COMPONENT FABRICATION FOR AXIAL TUBE BANK DESIGN
* Tubes - Bend to shape, cut off ends and finish ends.
* Liner - Roll formed (conventional) with one axial seam weld
(GTA or EB).
* Header Plates - Machine from plate stock.
* Manifold Tori - Die formed from sheet stock. Weld joints
machined for self-fixturing (consumable in weld) with
header plate.
* Inlet/Outlet Tubes - Stubs with maximum length (approximately
1. 5") suitable for welding internally from open end. Machined
for self-fixturing weld joint.
TABLE 12-7. ASSEMBLY SEQUENCE FOR AXIAL TUBE BANK DESIGN
* Align header plates in assembly fixture.
* Insert all tubes in header plates. Strap to liner.
* Weld (GTA or EB) ends of tubes to header plates
* With assembly in brazing fixture, apply brazing alloy.
* Braze in vacuum at 19770 K to 2089 0 K (3100 to 33000 F) for five
minutes.
* Weld manifold tori to headers.
* Weld inlet/outlet tubes to headers.
joint) was selected for the assembly sequence shown in Table 12-7. In any case, the
inner liner must be brazed to the tubes to provide good heat transfer to the HSHX. In
Figure 12-2, the degree of joint complexity increases the number one to number four.
Only a detailed stress analysis, of the type normally performed in a final design effort,
will show which joint design is preferred. It should be emphasized that any one of these
designs, or a variation thereof, would certainly provide the necessary strength.
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1. All-Brazed Joint BRAZE
Pro
* Simple, all brazed design
Con
* Braze may contaminate subsequent welds TUBE
* High stress concentration possible at BRAZE TUBE
Tube-header interface * HEADER PLATE
2. Weld-Braze Joint BRAZE
Pro
* No weld contamination
Con
* High stress concentration still possible *
WELD /e
3. All-Welded Joint
Pro
* No braze at joint
* Possible solution to stress concentraction problem
Con WELD
* Not sure will do job *
4. Composite Joint BRAZE
Pro L
* Solves stress problem
* No weld contamination
Con WELD* Extra pieces and weld steps
* Dependent on results of detailed stress analysis
Figure 12-2. Tube-Header Joint Designs
12.3 FABRICATION EXPERIENCE
Since brazing was considered necessary for the axial tube bank design, the corrugated
plate fin design, and some variations of the machined fin design it was necessary to
demonstrate that good braze joints could be made without causing grain growth or other
detrimental processes in the parent metal. Table 12-8 shows the technical considera-
tions of brazing. Table 12-9 shows various braze alloys which could be considered.
Small samples of various refractory alloys were brazed with the AS-540 braze alloy.
Figure 12-3 shows the results of various tests on a brazed columbium alloy joint.
Figure 12-4 shows the excellent microstructure obtained with Cb-103 and T-111
alloys. Although brazing is less attractive than welding it was concluded that brazing
could be successfully performed on any of the candidate designs.
TABLE 12-8. BRAZING AS A MEANS OF STRUCTURE FABRICATION
Major Advantages Major Disadvantages Technical Considerations
* Minimal distortion- * Introduction of * Metallurgical inter-
entire structure additional alloys actions with parent
uniformly heated metal
* Minimal grain growth - * Service temperatures
no melting pirent metal
* Minimal aging reactions * Process & Service
environment
* Wettability and flow
* Joint Strength
* Compatability with
Coating
TABLE 12-9. BRAZE ALLOYS
Parent Metal/Alloys Alloy Designation Alloy Composition Braze Temp., o K (0 F)
Cb Alloy AS 514 V-35Cb 2144-2172 (3400-3450)
Cb Alloy - Ti-400Cb 2144-2172 (3400-3450)
Cb Alloy AS 546 V-30Cb-10Zr 2033-2061 (3200-3250)
Cb Alloy AS 547 V29Cb-10 Zr- 1977-2005 (3100-3150)
2Si
Cb Alloy AS 501 Ti-30V 1950-1977 (3050-3100)
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Base Metal: F-48 (Columbium Alloy)
Braze:o Alloy Nominal Melting Range oF Ductility
Designation Composition Solidus Liquidus As Cast
AS-540 60V-30Cb-10Ti 3200 3300 Ductile
Wettability -
Time 5 Min.
Temperature 3300F
Contact Angle 310
Mag: 1.25X
Microstructure -
As Brazed 3300F/5 Min. Heat Treated 2500F/10 hrs.
Y2662 Y2952
Hardness Traverse - Heat Treated
As Brazed (3300F/5 Min) (2500F/10 Hrs.)
Erosion: .001" Erosion: .001"
600 700
Braze
600 [ I 600500 Q F-48
w Braze F-48
r500 500
F-48
3 400 a 400
300 o300
200 200
100 100
0 .02 .4 .U .8 .. U4
Distance, Inches Distance, Inches
Figure 12-3. Braze Alloy Summary Data Sheet
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AS-540
S60Cb-30V-10Ti
3300°F/5 Min
C-103 T-111
Cb-10Hf-10Ti-0.7Zr Ta-8W-2Hf
FIGURE 12-4. GE AS-540 BRAZE ALLOY ON Cb-103 AND T-111 ALLOYS
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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Support Equipment for the HSA encompasses both that GSE necessary to handle the
Heat Source and HSA on the ground and that equipment required to remove the Heat
Source from the assembly in space. Support Equipment was investigated primarily
to determine any possible impact on HSA design and to identify existing MHW GSE
which can be used for the Mini-Brayton Program.
13.1 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
13.1.1 HEAT SOURCE SHIPPING
The MHW Heat Source Shipping container can be used, apparently with no modifica-
tions, for the Mini Brayton Heat Source. There may be some advantage to subcooling
the Heat Source prior to launch to provide added margin in the transient heat up time
during ascents. If this is done, it can be accomplished using the shipping container
prior to removal with some modification to the gas management system.
13.1.2 HEAT SOURCE LOADING
It is desirable from a safety point of view to load the heat source into the system as
late as possible in the countdown. Presumably then, all components of the Mini-Brayton
system except the Heat Source will be assembled prior to the Heat Source loading
sequence. Figure 13-1 shows a conceptual sketch of a device to load the Heat Source
into the HSA. A screw jack hoist mechanism is used in conjunction with the loading
fixture (Figure 13-2) to lift the heat source out of its shipping container, swing it
over the HSA in the Mini-Brayton Power System and lower it into the HSA. The
loading fixture, which interfaces with the Heat Source, is the same as the MHW
fixture design with minor modifications. The fixture is designed to engage the three
lifting lugs on the heat source and can be designed to load the Heat Source in the
horizontal direction as well. The sequence of steps to the load the heat source is
as follows.
1. Assemble the aft Heat Source support and End Enclosure Assembly (see
Figure 13-2) into the Heat Source Assembly.
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2. Assemble the Adapter Ring onto the forward end of the HSA.
3. Open the HS shipping container and load the forward heat source support
end enclosure assembly onto the heat source.
4. Position and attach the loading fixture to the HS shipping container.
5. Engage the loading fixture lifting lugs to the HS and take out the end play
against the loading fixture spanner wrench.
6. Raise the lifting fixture lug plate to remove the Heat Source from shipping
container.
7. Lift loading fixture with HS and position onto adapter ring
8. Lower HS into HSA
9. Rotate forward end enclosure into end enclosure bracket slots using hand
tool. (Note: Loading tool prevents heat source support from rotating
when rotating forward end enclosure)
10. Preload forward end enclosure bushing with loading fixture spanner
wrench to the desired preload and check torque of three retainer screws.
11. Disengage loading fixture lifting lugs and remove fixture.
12. Remove adapter ring.
HOIST MECHANISM -
HOIST DRIVE MOTOR 
- S -
TELESCOPING ARM -
LOADING FIXTURE DRIVE MOTOR -
LOADING FIXTURE MANUAL CRANK_.-~_ 
-/,
LOADING FIXTURE FEATURES
HEAT SOURCE - SCREW JACKHEAT SOURCE ASSEMBLIES
\ .t , "-* Heat source loading fixtureLOCATING PINS same as HW fixture with
S .minor modifications
S, ,o--A. - Loading sequence estimated
to be 30 minutes
j ) HEAT SOURCE
POER SYS SHIPPING CONTAINERPOWER SYSTEM
'EAT SOUCE EQT -,,E
Figure 13-1. Heat Source Loading
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KAI EAICLOSARE 
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AFt/A /T/A/C PLTE-
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suPPoSr POS/UPPORTI
/A LIFT/AA/ L-A
+ - -- -- ----- F WD
4EAT SOURCE 
EAT SOURC E LOA/ FXT A EMBLY
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Figure 13-2. Heat Source Loading Fixture
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This entire sequence is estimated to take approximately 30 minutes. If the Heat
Source is precooled to approximately room temperature prior to loading, Heat
Source surface temperatures will remain below 466. 5°K (3800F). If precooling is
not accomplished, the loading operation must include active cooling of the Heat
Source from the time it is taken out of the shipping cask to the time it is inserted
in the HSA.
13.2 ORBIT HANDLING
The requirement to be able to remove the Heat Source in orbit leads to the need for
an on orbit handling tool. The tool designed for this purpose is very similar to the
SNAP 27 astronaut handling tool used in the Apollo mission. Figure 13-3 shows a
drawing of the Mini-Brayton tool. It is designed to disengage the Heat Source from
the HSA in three different ways in the event of freeze up of HSA mechanical fittings.
These options are described in the sequence of operations listed below.
1. Normal Removal Operation
a. Position tool against forward end enclosure with heat source attach-
ment jaw in outboard position.
b. Engage heat source assembly structure attachment arm to heat
source assembly.
c. Engage heat source attachment jaw
(1) Radially to inboard position
(2) Longitudinally to forward position
d. Engage and rotate spanner wrench assembly to disengage forward
end enclosure, (movement in aft position).
e. Disengage Heat Source assembly attachment arm.
f. Remove heat source.
2. Contingency in event of freeze of forward end enclosure bushing at
sequence 'id'.
a. Loosen 3 retainer screws (Quick Release 1 turn screws) with special
allen wrench tool
b. Rotate forward end enclosure to disengage from heat source assembly
using special allen wrench.
Continue sequence 'e' and 'f'.
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3. Contingency in event of freeze of 3 retainer screws at sequence 'dl'.
a. 3d Shear heads of 3 retaining screws with special allen wrench
tool.
b. Continue sequence '2d', 'e' and 'f'.
The design of the on-orbit handling tool does not affect the design of the HSA. The
requirement to remove the heat source in orbit however does impose design con-
straints on the HSA and necessitates incorporation of redundant release mechanisms.
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Figure 13-3. On Orbit Handling Tool
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SECTION 14
CONCLUSIONS
Three candidate HSA design concepts which satisfy all imposed design and safety
requirements have been developed utilizing the MHW 2400 W(t) Heat Source. The
designs differ in Heat Source Heat Exchanger configuration; one concept incorporates
a bank of 35 tubes, the other two are plate fin heat exchangers. The recommended HSHX
is a machined plate fin, diffusion bonded design which can be fabricated without brazing.
The complete HSA weighs 78 Kg (171 lb) and operates with a maximum steady state
Heat Source temperature of (1269 0 K) 1825 0 F, which is 1040K (187oF) less than the MHW
specified operating temperature. It is anticipated that detailed design optimization will
result in lower weights. Auxiliary Cooling is effected on the launch pad by passing a
coolant gas such as dry Nitrogen, directly over the Heat Source in the annulus formed
by the Heat Source Emmissivity Sleeve and the HSHX. The Heat Source can be easily
maintained below 500°K (4400 F) and exposed surfaces below 466.50K (380°F) during this
prelaunch phase of the mission. Emergency cooling in the event of a Heat Source over-
temperature condition is accomplished by the automatic opening of two insulated
end doors on either side of the HSA. The materials recommended for the HSHX, as well
as for those structural support components of the HSA which are within the insulation
enclosure, is either of the Columbium refractory alloys, Cb-103 or Cb-lZr. Both
materials are essentially equivalent in overall performance. However long term (5
year) creep stress property data at operational temperatures is lacking and a test
program will be required to completely characterize either of the candidate materials.
The HSA can be used singly or in parallel with one or two additional HSA's to provide
output powers of 500 W(e), 1200 W(e) and 2000 W(e) (nominal). Two year grounds test
of the Mini-Brayton System would require that the HSA be either situated in a vacuum
chamber or in an inert gas environment to preclude oxidation of the recommended
refractory alloys.
It is concluded that the HSA design concepts generated during this study program are
feasible designs; can be fabricated into reliable assemblies; and can be integrated into a
Mini-Brayton Power System which will provide a long life versatile power system for
future spacecraft.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMNS
ACS Auxiliary Cooling Subsystem
BRU Brayton Rotating Unit
(Turbine - Alternator - Compressor Assembly)
EB Electron Beam (Welding)
ECD Emergency Cooling Device
(A device which automatically releases the emergency cooling doors)
ECS Emergency Cooling Subsystem (The combination of ECD and
Emergency Cooling Doors for the Space Shuttle mission or
melting insulation for the Titan IIIC mission)
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram
GSE Ground Support Equipment
GTA Gas Tungsten Arc (Welding)
HS Heat Source
HSA Heat Source Assembly
IGS Inert Gas Subsystem
(Identical to the ACS with the use of a pure inert gas and
appropriate valving as required).
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APPENDIX B
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES
B. 1 FORMAT
Figure B-I shows the format used in presenting safety requirements and guidelines.
B. 2 NUMBER
The identifying alphanumerical designation consists of two letters followed by a se-
quential number.
Requirement (G - Guideline)
Design Feature (0 - Operations Feature)
Numerical Designator
RD-1
The first alpha character denotes whether the statement is a mandatory requirement
(R) for a Guideline (G). The second alpha character distinguishes between design
considerations (D) or operational procedures (0). The numbers run sequentially for
requirements and guidelines.
B. 3 FUNCTION
The function number and function name denote the functions from the FFBD of Figure
3-3 to which the requirement or guideline is pertinent.
B. 4 OPERATION
The operation block is used to denote the particular operation (lower level function) to
which the guideline is directed. A typical operation category is isotope cooling.
B. 5 MISSION PHASE/EVENT
The phase or phases of the mission for which the guideline applies is listed. In general,
they correspond to top level functions of Figure 3-3.
B-1
CLASSIFICATION
CLASS IFICATION PROGRAM ELEMENT TITLE
NUMBER
RD-1 HSA/Mini-Brayton/GSE On Pad and Landing Site Cooling of Heat
Sources.
RD-2 HSA Heat Source Cooling System
RD-3 HSA Heat Source Emergency Cooling
REQUIREMENTS
(DESIGN)
RD-4 HSA Blast and Fragmentation Protection
RD-5 HSA Fireball and Solid Fire Protection
RD-6 HSA Shuttle Crew: Radiation Exposure
Shuttle P/L Integration Control
RD-7 HSA/Shuttle Payload Status Monitoring
GUIDELINESGUIDELI  GD-3 Mini-Brayton Support Transfer Module(DES IGN) Equipment
GO-3 Mission Planning Quick Retrieval Operations
GUIDELINES
(OPERATIONAL)
GO-4 Mission Planning In-Orbit Repairs
Figure B-1. Safety Requirement and Guideline Format
B. 6 REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
This block indicates the program element, e.g., Shuttle, GSE, Mini-Brayton HSA,
etc., to which the safety requirement is allocated. If a requirement is allocated to
the Mini-Brayton HSA, for example, it implies a HSA design requirement.
B. 7 TITLE
The title is provided to briefly identify the subject matter of the guideline. It is used
to provide the necessary descriptive words to concisely identify the guideline and
content.
B. 8 REQUIREMENT OR GUIDELINE
The statement contains the requirement or guideline, and is usually a brief statement,
which describes a suggested means by which a hazard may be alleviated or eliminated.
B.9 POTENTIAL HAZARD
This block contains a brief definition of the nature of the potential hazard(s) presented.
B. 10 REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS
This block is intended to provide additional information needed to further define the
guideline, indicate integration problems, or to indicate techniques worthy of con-
sideration which could be applied to eliminate the hazard.
B.11 REFERENCES
The key references (supporting data) in the Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety
study final report Contract NAS8-26283 (Ref. 10) or other related documents which are
used to arrive at the guidelines are listed.
B. 12 CROSS REFERENCES
The cross reference column lists related guidelines in the appendix.
B. 13 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS/GUIDELINES
The set of safety requirements and guidelines are given, along with an index, in the
following pages.
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INDEX OF SAFETY GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS
ClassificationClassification Program Element TitlbNumber
RD-1 HSA/Mini-Brayton/GSE On Pad and Landing Site Cooling of Heat
Sources.
RD-2 HSA Heat Source Cooling System
RD-3 HSA Heat Source Emergency Cooling
Requirements RD-4 HSA Blast and Fragmentation Protection
(Design) RD-5 HSA Fireball and Solid Fire Protection
RD-6 HSA Shuttle Crew: Radiation Exposure
Shuttle P/L Integration Control
RD-7 HSA/Shuttle Payload Status Monitoring
Guidelines GD-3 Mini-Brayton Support Transfer Module
(Design) Equipment
GO-3 Mission Planning Quick Retrieval Operations
Guidelines
(Operational) GO-4 Mission Planning In-Orbit Repairs
GO-5
NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE RD-1 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
6. 1 Survive Pre-Launch Environment Heat Source Cooling at
1.7 Transfer Shuttle Orbiter to MRF Launch Pad and Landing
1.8 Remove, Service or Dispose of P/L Site
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Pre-Launch; Recovery Mini-Brayton GSE and HSA
TITLE: ON PAD AND LANDING SITE COOLING OF HEAT SOURCE
GUIDELINE
Maintain the external surface areas of the Heat Source Assembly below 466. 5
0 K (3800 F)
during Pre-Launch operations and Landing site operations. The HSA shall be designed
to interface with the GSE.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
On a standard day at sea level, the radiating surface of an uncooled heat source
can reach an equilibrium temperature in excess of 8670K (11000 F). This would
present a hazardous condition in the presence of booster fuels.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
Cooling during pre-launch and at the landing site can be accomplished by pumping cold 
nitrogen or
other similar inert fluid over the heat source. The cold nitrogen can be supplied by launch pad/
landing site GSE that interfaces with the Heat Source Assembly's Auxiliary Cooling Heat Exchanger.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 (Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety) REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-4-1, Section 4, 5, Appendix C.
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. RD101 (72SD4201-5- 2 ). RD-2
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SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. epDATE:
RD-2ept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
5. 1 Survive Launch Environment
4. 1 Survive Shuttle Orbiter Environment Heat Source Cooling After
2.1 Survive Remote Orbital Environment Lift-Off
1.4 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Re-entry
1.5 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Landing
1 6 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Safing
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Launch/Ascent; On Orbit Operations; Re-entry; Landing Heat Source Assembly
TITLE: HEAT SOURCE COOLING SYSTEM
GUIDELINE
The Heat Source Assembly shall include active and/or passive cooling systems capable
of maintaining the external surface areas of the heat source below-13670 K (20000 F)
during ascent and subsequent mission phases.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
An isotope heat source provides a continuous flow of heat energy throughout its lifetime.
The heat must be removed in a manner that maintains the temperature of the heat source
and nearby equipment at acceptably low levels. Inadequate heat removal will result in
excessive temperatures that can render equipment unoperative and the heat source
capsule unable to contain the isotope fuel.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
During launch, while the power module (BRU) is shut down, an active cooling system may be re-
quired. Heat source cooling could be accomplished if required during this phase by a low tempera-
ture Nitrogen system similar to that used during pre-launch but carried on board. During on orbit
operations, passive cooling (direct radiation to space) can be employed once the Shuttle P/L doors
are opened and provided environmental shielding does not preclude a view of space. During re-entry,
when the Shuttle P/L doors are closed, cooling of the heat source can be accomplished by the low
temperature Nitrogen system or by a water boil-off system. Upon landing, Heat Source Cooling
would be accomplished by GSE once access to the Payload Bay is available.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C; 72SD4201-2-1 Sec. 5
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. RD-102; (72SD4201-5-2) RD-1
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NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE D-3 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
5.1 Survive Launch Environment
4.1 Survive Shuttle Orbiter Environment Heat Source Cooling Contingency
1.4 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Re-entry
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Launch/Ascent; On Orbit Operations, Re-entry, Landing Heat Source Assembly
TITLE: HEAT SOURCE EMERGENCY COOLING
GUIDELINE
Provide a redundant Heat Source cooling system as part of the Heat Source Assembly, to be
operable during all mission phases in event of failure of the primary cooling system 
within
the Shuttle.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
Excessive temperatures causing breach of the isotope fuel container could result from failure
of the prime cooling system.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS: The following are candidates for the Emergency
Cooling Device: (1) A thermostatically activated door on the HSA which exposes uninsulated
areas of the HS to the Shuttle payload bay walls; (2) Cold gas and/or water boil off system utilizing
a pumped loop which rejects heat to the Shuttle payload bay during ascent and perhaps during re-entry
when higher Shuttle wall temperatures exist. Suitable controls can permit the pumped loop to act as
a water boil-off system, if necessary, during re-entry; (3) Energy absorption (change in phase) system
possibly utilizing the HSA insulation material (contamination effects on other payloads in the orbiter
payload bay should be considered); (4) Heat pipes to conduct heat to the Shuttle radiating panels.
Effects of elevated radiating panels should be considered.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS; 72SD4201-4-1, Sections 4, 5, 6, Appendix C
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. RD-103 (72SD4201-5-2) RD-2
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NO. DATE:SAFETY GUIDELINE RD4 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
6.4 Survive Pre-Launch Explosion Environ-
ment
5.3 Survive Launch Explosion Environment Transporting Payload in Shuttle
1. 3 Survive Uncontrolled Orbiter Re-entry
and Impact
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Pre-Launch, Launch/Ascent, Re-entry Heat Source Assembly
TITLE: BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION
GUIDELINE
Provide adequate blast overpressure and fragmentation protection to assure containment
of all radioactive material in event of a Shuttle explosion.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
The proximity of the isotope payload in the Shuttle cargo bay to the Shuttle fuel tankage may result
in extremely high blast overpressures and fragment velocities in the event of a tankage explosion.
To prevent breaking of the isotope fuel capsules and the release of radioactive material to the
environment, shielding may be required (unless the heat source can be shown to survive the severe
environment without shielding).
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
Three possible approaches to the design of a blast shield (protection of heat source capsules from
the blast overpressure, high velocity fragments, and fireball temperatures that might ensue in the
event of an explosion of the Shuttle main tankage) are:
* Hemispherical shield - interface shielding between the heat source and Shuttle tankage;
permits passive thermal control.
* 4n shield - heat source is completely protected by shielding.
(Continued next page)
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, 5, Appendix A; 72SD4201-4-2, App. A.
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. RD-104 (72SD4201-5-2). RD-5
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NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE RSept. 1972
REVISION: A(Cont.) May 15, 1973
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
Transporting Payload in Shuttle
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
TITLE:
GUIDELINE
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
* Augmented hemispherical shield - shielding nearly encompasses the heat source, but has
an opening (away from probable source of explosion) that permits radiation of sufficient
heat to maintain acceptable heat source temperatures.
An alternative approach that permits the use of lighter and simpler shielding is to increase the
separation distance between the heat source and the source of explosion. Blast overpressure and
fragment velocities are rapidly reduced as the separation distance increases.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS:
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO.
B-9
NO. DATE:SAFETY GUIDELINE RD-5 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
6.4 Survive Pre-Launch Explosion Environ-
ment
5.3 Survive Launch Explosion Environment Survive Fire
1. 3 Survive Uncontrolled Orbiter Re-entry
and Impact
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Pre-Launch, Launch/Ascent, Re-entry Heat Source
TITLE: FIREBALL AND SOLID FIRE PROTECTION
GUIDELINE
A goal of the Heat Source design shall be to withstand the fireball and solid propellant
fire which may result from a Shuttle explosion.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
Solid fire temperatures in the aftermath of a launch pad Shuttle explosion are expected to reach
2600 0 K (42200 F) and last for a 10-minute duration. Liquid propellant fireball temperatures are
expected to reach 29800 K (49000 F) immediately after the explosion and level off to approximately
(12500 K) 1800' F in 14 seconds.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
Preliminary analyses of the MHW program indicates that the Fuel Sphere Assemblies
will survive these environments.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-4-1, Sections 3, 4, 5; Appendix A; 72SD4201-4-2,
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. RD-105, 72SD4201-5-2. Appendix A. RD-4
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NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE RD-6 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
5.0 Launch and Insert into Orbit
4.0 Perform Orbital Payload Checkout Transporting Payload in Shuttle
3.0 Transfer Payload in Orbit
1.4 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Re-entry
1.5 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Landing
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Pre-launch, Launch/Ascent; On Orbit, Ops. Recovery Shuttle Payload 
Integration
and/or Mini-Brayton HSA
TITLE: SHUTTLE CREW: RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL
GUIDELINE
Minimize the crew dose rate from nuclear payload throughout all operations 
by appropriate
separation distances or radiation shielding (maximum allowable of 150 mrem/day from
nuclear payload).
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
Radiation exposure to the crew in excess of permissible dose levels.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
The allowable exposure limit currently in use by NASA is a yearly 
average of 200 mrem/day to the
bone marrow (5 cm depth) from all radiation sources. Cosmic, galactic, and trapped radiation
contribute approximately 50 mrem/day. Therefore, the Shuttle crew 
exposure should be minimized
to a maximum allowable dose rate from the nuclear payload of 150 mrem/day. 
The 150 mrem/day
maximum allowable dose is based on yearly averages. Since most crew 
time durations are short,
higher dose rates may be permissible for shorter periods 
of time.
REFERENCES: 
CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-2-1, Section 4.2, Appendix 
A
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. GO-134, 75SD4201-5-
2
.
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SAFETY GUIDELINE
RD-7 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
6.0 Perform Pre-Launch & Countdown Ops.
5. 2 Perform Launch & Inject Sequence Payload Monitoring
4.2 Startup and Operate P/L In Shuttle
Orbiter
1.4 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Re-entry
1.5 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Landing
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Pre-Launch, Launch/Ascent, On Orbit Ops, Re-entry, Land- Heat Source Assembly
ing and Shuttle
TITLE: PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING
GUIDELINE
Provide sensors to monitor Heat Source Assembly and Space Shuttle Wall temperature and crew
compartment radiation levels. Provide an alarm to warn crew of a potential problem.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
Overtemperature of Heat Source Assembly could result in Space Shuttle equipment and structure
damage or even release of fuel in a runaway condition if HS fuel temperatures were to exceed
24830 K (40100 F)
Overexposure of crew could result from fuel release
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
Outputs of monitoring sensors should be displayed in crew compartment and should trigger
warning devices in the event of a hazardous situation.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS; 72SD4201-4-1, Section 4, 5
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. GD-116 (72SD4201-5-2)
GD-123 (72SD4201-5-2)
GD-124 (72SD4201-5-2)
B-12
NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE GD-3 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
7.2 Transfer P/L to Pad
or 7.3 Transfer P/L to MRF Ground Handling and Shuttle/
or 7.4 Transfer P/L to VAB Mini-Brayton Integration
7.5 Install P/L in P/L Bay & Checkout
1. 8 Remove, Service or Dispose of P/L
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Pre-Launch, Recovery Mini-Brayton Support
Equipment
TITLE: TRANSFER MODULE
GUIDELINE
Provide a Transfer Module for installation of the Power Module in
the Shuttle Payload Bay.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
Dropping and damaging Mini-Brayton Power Module.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
A transfer module can provide a safe method of handling the payload and mounting it in the 
Shuttle
payload bay. It is a carriage type of assembly in which the Power Module is 
placed prior to instal-
lation in the Shuttle. The key advantage is that required ancillary equipment can be incorporated
into the transfer module rather than mounted on the Shuttle; for example, the capability to provide
coolant gas during ascent or re-entry could be accomplished by the transfer module. The disadvantage
of this approach is the additional weight and volume penalty.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-4-1, Sections 3, 4, 5
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. GD-121 (72SD4201-5-2)
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NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE GO-3 Sept. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
7.0 Perform Ground Flow Ops at Launch Fac.
6.0 Perform Pre-Launch & Countdown Ops Emergency Retrieval
1.6 Perform Shuttle Orbiter Safing
1.7 Transfer Shuttle Orbiter to MRF
1. 8 Remove, Service or Dispose of P/L
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
Prelaunch, Recovery Mission Planning
(Ground Operations)
TITLE: QUICK RETRIEVAL OPERATIONS
GUIDELINE
Provide quick retrieval operations to remove the Mini-Brayton from the
Shuttle during an emergency.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
The isotope heat source presents a potential risk situation when the Shuttle experiences an
emergency such as a fire. This hazard can be reduced by quickly removing the heat source
from the Shuttle.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
Consideration should be given to removing the Mini-Brayton power module or individual
heat sources.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD4201-4-1, Sections 4, 5, 6, Appendix C
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. GO-118 (72SD4201-5-2)
B-14
NO. DATE:
SAFETY GUIDELINE GO-4 Se t. 1972
REVISION:
FUNCTION NO. FUNCTION NAME OPERATION
3.1 Transfer Payload from Shuttle Abort Mission
MISSION PHASE/EVENT REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
On Orbit Operations Mission Planning
TITLE; IN-ORBIT REPAIRS
GUIDELINE
When non-reparable equipment failures preclude placing the nuclear payload in
earth orbit, the payload shall be returned to earth by the Shuttle.
POTENTIAL HAZARD:
Random re-entry of the nuclear heat source in less than ten half lives of
the isotope fuel.
REMARKS/INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS:
It is desirable to recover the nuclear payload and return it to earth rather than either jettisoning
the nuclear payload in low earth orbit (for possible recovery at a later date) or boosting the payload
to a high earth disposal orbit. Therefore, when in-orbit repairs are unsuccessful, the Shuttle 
and
payload should return to the landing site. The nuclear payload can be stored at the launch/landing
site for use at a later date.
REFERENCES: CROSS
CONTRACT NAS 8-26283 REFERENCES;
DOCUMENTS: 72SD 4201-4-1, Section 6
SAFETY GUIDELINE NO. GO-138 (72SD4201-5-2)
B-15/B-16
